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Reviving the Declaratory Judgment: A New
Path to Structural Reform
EMILY CHIANG†
INTRODUCTION
We stand on the cusp of a new era in public interest
litigation, one that has been several decades in the making
and one that will shape the future of structural reform for
years to come. After sixty years of being defined—and
constrained—by Brown v. Board of Education,1 it is time to
move on to a new way of doing justice. This Article will begin
the task of describing the shift in the making and urge
reformers to take note, lest they lose the opportunity to help
shape the institutional litigation of the future.
The giants of public interest legal scholarship, Abram
Chayes and Owen Fiss, catalogued the first major shift in
legal practice and philosophy, from a private rights dispute
resolution model to a public law litigation model.2 That shift,
which began with Brown, has defined two generations of
legal practice, informing how both academics and
practitioners think about institutional reform and civil
rights. But all good things must come to an end, and so too,
the Brown-defined era of public interest litigation centered
around the structural injunction.
Reformers and courts have begun to engage in new ways
of transforming institutions. Some aspects of the change in
the air are already evident in the existing literature, which
† Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law. Many thanks to
Jessica Horton for her invaluable research assistance and to Margo Schlanger,
Dennis Parker, and Andy Hessick for their comments.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss,
1978 Term].
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describes a movement away from judge-centered injunctive
relief towards a “new governance” in the form of more
multilateral—and experimental—ways of fixing our most
troubled social institutions.3 Other aspects have yet to
develop. This Article contends that (for better or worse)
structural reform litigation as Professors Fiss and Chayes
knew it has jumped the proverbial shark. It urges reformers
to adapt, and to overhaul that which is firmly in their
control—their requests for relief—or face the risk of being left
behind. If reformers fail to adjust their pleadings and
practice, the forces that have long pressed the decline in the
traditional model of structural reform litigation will likely
have their way.
Although lawyers continue to request injunctive relief
and courts continue to grant it, this model of reform faces
increasing and inexorable pressure to change, both
doctrinally and culturally. Judicial minimalism and
separation of powers ideologies are ascendant, and the
paradigm of the judge as savior of the downtrodden and
bringer of justice is in marked decline. As some scholars have
already identified, new practices are emerging. Charles
Sabel, William Simon, and Michael Dorf, for example, have
written compellingly about the rise of experimentalism,
wherein lower courts act on a smaller scale and encourage
greater stakeholder participation in reform.4 Margo
Schlanger has argued that the traditional judge-centric
understanding of structural reform is overly narrow and fails
to take into account the multilateral nature of institutional
reform.5 Others have described a change in the nature of the

3. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 877-78 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998);
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-50 (2004); Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the
Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994,
2000-01 (1999) [hereinafter Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge].
4. See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
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structural injunctions issued to become narrower and more
focused on “outputs” than “inputs.”6
To these observations, this Article adds the following: the
emerging era of reform is defined by the fact that modern
litigation is neither filed nor proceeds with the single-minded
goal of procuring a structural injunction, but is rather
intended to provide the leverage needed for negotiation with
defendants; that just as the structural injunction is no longer
the centerpiece of litigation, litigation is no longer the
centerpiece of structural reform; and that repeat players, like
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and large law
firms, who increasingly drive structural reform have become
too reliant on a cumbersome model of litigation.7
The new era of reform remains protean and institutional
reform has not yet been completely foreclosed. New
governance describes one aspect of the new era, but
reformers—and litigators in particular—can still change the
template by which systemic change is procured. This Article
urges public interest lawyers to reconsider and repurpose a
long overlooked remedy: the declaratory judgment.
Declaratory judgments are currently an after-thought in
public interest litigation, routinely appended onto claims
that seek structural injunctive relief with little
consideration. This approach devalues and arguably
eliminates the need for declaratory relief, which is uniquely
suited as a tool for structural reform in our age—and
theoretically, at least, easier to procure than injunctions.
The declaratory judgment is a remedy with which even
the most ardent judicial minimalists should be comfortable:
it can provide the same leverage to drive negotiation as a
request for a structural injunction and it can make the reform
process more efficient and cost-effective, and thereby more
available. Perhaps most importantly, it neatly dovetails the
temperament of the modern reform era besotted with new
governance—which seeks to replace judicial majesty with
multilateral stakeholder involvement—but stays rooted in
the exigencies of actual litigation practice. It is fully capable
6. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004) [hereinafter
Sabel & Simon, Destabilization].
7. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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of creating the space needed for the many facets of
institutional reform we still require.
This Article urges litigators to let go of the traditional
telling of the Brown v. Board of Education story—as the case
that ushered in a brave new world of reform litigation
centered on the structural injunction—and to welcome a new
telling of the Brown story.8 This retelling of Brown is a fuller
and richer tale, which includes both Browns I and II as well
as the years in between. It is one that shifts the emphasis
away from the structural injunction and towards the need for
remedies that prod the political branches to take action. It is
one that values political and judicial expediency, efficiency in
the use of limited resources, and practical impact over
traditional pathways.
Some may consider this proposal threatening, or even
dangerous, because it requires a certain surrender of control
and may produce unpredictable results. But negotiated
settlement has always been the true goal of institutional
reform litigation and litigators would do well to “think
outside of the regulatory tool box,” identifying new and
improved ways to drive defendants to the bargaining table.9
Part I of the Article provides a brief summary of the
traditional model for structural reform, decoupling the right
at stake from the remedy traditionally sought, treating the
paradigmatic case for reform separately from the structural
injunction. Part II explores the new era in public interest
litigation confronting courts and reformers today. It begins
with the premise of a decline in the traditional structural
injunction model, summarizes the current scholarship on the
experimentalism and multilateralism that have evolved to
fill the void, and identifies other critical aspects of the new
reform. Part III introduces the declaratory judgment as a
powerful and heretofore unconsidered vehicle for change, one
that is both consistent with the separationist forces that have
pressed the decline of the old reform model and one that
8. Cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994) (arguing that Brown was
“directly responsible for only the most token forms of southern public school
desegregation”).
9. Lobel, supra note 3, at 367.
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offers increased efficiencies and doctrinal advantages.
Finally, Part IV examines the declaratory judgment in
action, exploring how the strategic use of declaratory
judgments can streamline and make more effective systemic
reform litigation in the real world.
I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL REFORM
As long as social institutions exist, there will be a need
for institutional reform, but the means by which that reform
takes place need not be static. This Part begins with the
foundations first laid by Chayes and Fiss in the commentary
and by Brown in the doctrine. It will first describe that which
we cannot change—the underlying case demanding
institutional reform—and then that which we can—the way
in which institutional reform litigators have thus far chosen
to meet that challenge. The point of this Part is to begin the
process of decoupling these two: to recognize that the right is
neither interchangeable nor inextricably intertwined with
the remedy.
A. The Paradigmatic Structural Reform Case
The structural, or administrative, injunction has long
been the gold standard for a certain type of civil rights action:
cases involving rights violations by an institution
unresponsive to political reform.10 These cases typically have
several common (and related) characteristics, inherent to the
nature of the problem they present. First, they involve rights
violations that result from the structure of an institution
rather than individual “one-off” rights violations.11 School
desegregation remains the paradigmatic example of this
characteristic: no amount of individual damages awards
could remediate the problem, which required a prospective
structural remedy rather than individual retrospective relief.

10. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1144 (1977)
[hereinafter Fiss, Dombrowski] (describing the administrative injunction as one
that “attempts to change actual behavior,” as when it “seeks to reorganize an
ongoing social institution”).
11. See, e.g., Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 18.
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The need for institutional reform arises from a failure of the
institution writ large.
Second, the institution in question has failed to meet
applicable legal standards.12 Some scholars have
characterized this element as “the least controversial aspect
of institutional reform adjudication,” contending that “[o]ften
the plaintiff’s claim that the institution fails to meet
minimum standards is uncontested.”13 Although this
observation may hold true in some contexts and with respect
to some institutional defendants, it is often not the case,
particularly in the context of the areas of reform discussed
below, which have been subject to extensive litigation on the
liability front. In fact, it is precisely the refusal to concede
liability that engenders the costly litigation this Article urges
reformers to streamline and minimize, so that resources that
might otherwise be spent defending a case may instead be
invested in the institution that is the subject of litigation.
Third, these problems are typically what Michael Dorf
calls “big cases,” or those that “tax the administrative
capacities of courts,”14 as opposed to hard cases, which
12. Owen Fiss describes the institutions in question as constituting “a new unit
of constitutional law—the state bureaucracy.” Id. at 4; see also id. at 22 (“The
focus is on a social condition, not incidents of wrongdoing, and also on the
bureaucratic dynamics that produce that condition.”). Charles Sabel and William
Simon describe these problems as having “two elements: failure to meet
standards and political blockage.” Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6,
at 1062.
13. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1062-63; see also id. at
1065 (“[D]efendants, or important constituents within the defendant institutions,
are often sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims. Even more often, defendants
welcome the new resources that the decree induces nonparty governmental and
private sources to volunteer.”); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1121, 1167 (1996) (“Although state officials are often the ones who violated the
Constitution in the first place, remedies often can be implemented by other state
governmental organs that were either unaware of the violations or that have
experienced a change of heart.”). This Article is not as sanguine.
14. Dorf, supra note 3, at 973. Myriam Gilles similarly describes these cases as
requiring “breadth and depth,” in the form of broad consensus that a problem
exists and a depth of passion about resolving it. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the
Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143,
147-48 (2003).
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typically implicate moral controversy.15 Relatedly, they also
tend to be “polycentric” in nature.16 They present a variety of
interrelated problems and the solutions are accordingly
complex and interrelated as well. There are multiple moving
parts, as with the classic example of allocating resources
under a fixed budget.17 It is difficult to solve one piece of the
problem without affecting other portions of the institution—
or other institutions—which may or may not themselves be
the subject of litigation or the target of reform.
Finally, these problems are resistant to being solved by
the political process.18 They are extensive and complicated
(and often expensive to resolve) which is why they tend to
persist even where there is widespread acknowledgment that
the problem exists.19 And, moreover, those affected by the
institution’s failure to meet standards often lack political
power. They are often poor, of color, and/or literally
disenfranchised because they are too young to vote, are
felons, or are incarcerated.20 Sometimes they are all of these
things at once. Neither the political branches nor
administrative agencies are typically inclined to take these
issues on without external prodding.
15. Dorf, supra note 3, at 972-73; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court
1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 49-50
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, 1995 Term].
16. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-47 (1982) (describing
legal and non-legal polycentricity); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-96 (1978) (describing polycentric tasks).
17. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1058.
18. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 247, 288 (1988) (noting the “numerous obstacles to legislative
action, the most important of which are the power of inertia, the lack of time, and
the futility of all-encompassing statutory codes”).
19. Cf. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1092 (“[I]t is
remarkable how rarely the practices that the plaintiffs attack seem to have been
the result of an exercise of authority by anyone. The situation is more often the
consequence of a failure or refusal to make policy.”).
20. Cf. id. at 1064 (noting that one premise of public law reform cases “involves
majoritarian political control unresponsive to the interests of a vulnerable,
stigmatized minority”).
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B. The Paradigmatic Institutional Reform Remedy: the
Structural Injunction
Much as Brown presented the paradigmatic case for
structural reform, the court-imposed solution in Brown
became the paradigmatic remedy for structural reform. 21
Plaintiffs’ side litigators came to see every case presenting
the need for structural reform as one in which a structural
injunction should be sought and judges often complied. 22
Brown was a true touchstone.23 As Fiss notes, “Brown was
accepted into the legal and popular culture as legitimate, so
much so that it began to function as an axiom. . . . As a
consequence federal court access was assumed for
administrative decrees reaching state prisons and mental
hospitals, public housing projects, and local police
departments.”24
In his groundbreaking article, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, Chayes describes an evolution from
the traditional conception of adjudication—which was
bipolar, retrospective, and self-contained, as with contracts

21. As Donald Horowitz puts it, “Brown created a magnetic field around the
courts . . . .” Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1281 (1983); see also Fiss,
1978 Term, supra note 2, at 2 (“As a genre of constitutional litigation, structural
reform has its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary effort to
translate the rule of Brown v. Board of Education into practice.”); Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983) (“The very evolution of this
extraordinary remedial weapon, now central to the modern conception of judicial
power, is inseparable from the desegregation effort and resistance to
it. . . . [J]udicial remedies became so intrusive largely because public resistance
precluded alternative methods for making Brown a reality.”).
22. See Yoo, supra note 13, at 1124 (“In 1994, federal court orders regulated
the conditions of confinement in 244 prisons in thirty-four different jurisdictions
. . . . [H]undreds of school districts remain under federal court order. . . . At one
point in the 1970s, it appears that federal courts had taken control
simultaneously of Alabama’s schools, mental hospitals, and prisons.”).
23. Indeed, Brown continues to serve as a touchstone in the context of the fight
for marriage equality for gays, in both the social and academic commentary. See,
e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial
Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2013).
24. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149 (footnote omitted).
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or property disputes—to public law litigation.25 This new
litigation had a more complicated party structure: an
adversary relationship that was “suffused and intermixed
with negotiating and mediating processes at every point,”
and a judge who presided majestically over the whole
sprawling mess.26 The end goal of the process was a
structural injunction: “the centerpiece of the . . . public law
model.”27
Fiss similarly describes the structural injunction as
essential to the resolution of a case presenting a need for
structural reform:
[T]he remedy at issue in a structural case is the injunction, and it
does not require a judgment about wrongdoing, future or past. The
structural suit seeks to eradicate an ongoing threat to our
constitutional values and the injunction can serve as the formal
mechanism by which the court issues directives as to how that is to
be accomplished. It speaks to the future. The prospective quality of
the injunction, plus the fact that it fuses power in the judge,
explains the preeminence of the injunction in structural reform. 28

Although Fiss notes in passing that “some other remedies
(e.g., declaratory judgments, conditional habeas corpus) have
many of the same qualities as the injunction, for example, its
prospectivity, and could be expected to be found in structural
suits,” his focus (and that of the courts) is on the injunction.29
Fiss adds that the injunction is predicated on legislative
failure; judges must act because the legislature is either

25. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1281-84.
26. Id. at 1284; see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374
(1982) (identifying and critiquing the phenomenon of managerial judging); cf.
ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 109-10 (2003) [hereinafter SANDLER &
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY] (“Judicial enforcement has gone from being a
declaration of rights to a managerial process. As a result, the courts have found
themselves up to their necks in budgetary, personnel, regulatory, and
programmatic choices of the kind previously made only by elected state and local
officials and their appointees.”).
27. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298.
28. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 23.
29. Id. at 23 n.50.
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unwilling or unable to do so.30 The judge must, moreover, act
for as long as her involvement is required, which may be
quite a while indeed. Per Fiss, the remedial phase in
structural litigation is by nature and of necessity prolonged,
“invariably result[ing] in a series of interventions—cycle
after cycle of supplemental relief.”31 The judge’s task is to
manage the issue and retain jurisdiction “as long as the
threat [to constitutional values] persists.”32 To these
observations about the nature of the injunction, others have
added: they are extensive and affirmative in their commands;
they are administrative in character and establish the courts
as a source of authority and accountability; and they are
legislative in nature.33
II. A NEW ERA IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
This Part contends that the decoupling process between
the right to institutional reform and the remedy
implemented has already begun. Structural reform continues
to take place, but more seldom under the auspices of a
structural injunction. A number of scholars have begun the
30. Id. at 9-10, 24; cf. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1308 (arguing that the “judicial
process is an effective mechanism for registering and responding to grievances
generated by the operation of public programs in a regulatory state
[because][u]nlike an administrative bureaucracy or a legislature, the judiciary
must respond to the complaints of the aggrieved”).
31. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 28. In fact, Fiss explicitly declares that
the court’s task in these cases “is not to declare who is right or who is wrong.” Id.
at 27.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1267-68. Horowitz also argues that structural
injunctions are also resistant to appellate review but this characterization may
not hold as strongly these days. Id. at 1268. Chayes has also described the
structural injunction as one that
seeks to adjust future behavior, not to compensate for past wrong. It is
deliberately fashioned rather than logically deduced from the nature of
the legal harm suffered. It provides for a complex, on-going regime of
performance rather than a simple, one-shot, one-way transfer. Finally, it
prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the court’s involvement
with the dispute.
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1298; see also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 637-41
(describing typical institutional suit and remedial decrees).
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process of identifying how and why this change is occurring,
but the conversation can be further enriched so that
reformers may better understand how to harness these
changes to achieve their goals.
A. The Decline of the Traditional Model
Not everyone was enamored with the structural
injunction model, which came under fierce criticism for
showing “minimal regard for the limits of the federal courts’
inherent powers.”34 Others have noted a number of the
disadvantages associated with structural injunctions, such
as the drain on court resources to formulate and implement,
the political capital such injunctions often require courts to
expend, and the degree of intrusion they require on the
workings of institutions courts may not readily understand.35
Sometimes, as with Brown, a paradigm shift is easy to
identify even without the benefit of hindsight. More often, it
is difficult to say when exactly a shift is about to begin,
whether one has begun, or when precisely it began.36 The
empirical question of whether the absolute number of
structural injunctions issued has declined over the last
several decades remains largely unanswered,37 but the

34. Yoo, supra note 13, at 1122; see also Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra
note 6, at 1090 (“Structural injunctions are accused of . . . excessively
concentrating power in the court at the expense of the electoral branches.”).
35. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 8-12; Fiss,
Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1148; Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling
Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 950-51 (1993); Meltzer,
supra note 18, at 320-21; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1379 (1991); Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued
Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 99, 107 (2007); Yoo, supra note 13,
at 1123 & nn.15-17.
36. In fact, Fiss, writing in 1979, had reason to believe the structural
injunction was already at risk as a model of litigation. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra
note 2, at 4-5 (describing the “counterassault” against the structural injunction
by the Burger Court).
37. Schlanger’s examination of prison litigation reform is a noteworthy
exception. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of
Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 553-54 (2006) [hereinafter
Schlanger, Civil Rights].
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academic commentary is largely in agreement that there has
been a decline.38
To be sure, some scholars have argued that the purported
decline has been exaggerated or does not actually exist. Even
as they document the rise of experimentalism, for example,
Sabel and Simon discuss the “protean persistence of public
law litigation.”39 Schlanger contends that in the context of jail
and prison litigation, at least, there is plenty of on-going
structural reform, and speculates “that the situation is
similar in other types of civil rights injunctive litigation, as
well.”40 Myriam Gilles suggests that this type of court activity
is actually alive and well because it has been co-opted by the
conservative movement as, for example, in the higher
education affirmative action cases.41 Ross Sandler and David
Schoenbrod argue that the landscape of federal statutory
regulation has provided judges with new and ever-increasing
means of entering decrees against state and local officials.42
This Article’s position is that although the structural
injunction is far from dead (and will likely be with us for some
time) it has lost its status as most favored remedy for
structural reform.
First, on the doctrinal front, the Court has acted
repeatedly to limit the scope and availability of these
injunctions. Judith Resnik has persuasively argued that “the
majority is developing a new theory of limitations on the
38. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 14, at 161; Richard L. Marcus, Public Law
Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 647, 648, 670 (1988);
Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 295 (1989) (noting that institutional reform litigation has
decreased in the late twentieth century); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown
v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693, 1696-1705 (2004).
39. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1021.
40. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra note 37, at 553-54; see also David Zaring,
National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1020-21 (2004).
41. Gilles, supra note 14, at 169-70; see also Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein,
Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 483, 493-502 (1984); Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court 2012
Term—Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).
42. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 11.
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equitable powers of the federal courts.”43 This set of
limitations—such as those requiring abstention on the part
of federal courts under certain conditions, or those governing
standing for injunctive relief—serves to make wholly
unavailable entire categories of relief for entire categories of
plaintiffs.44 Although some of these restrictions can be
circumvented, such as by filing in state rather than federal
court, they serve as the new doctrinal baseline with which
litigants and the lower courts must work. While issuing these
limitations, the Court has also made clear its declining
interest in lower court micro-management of complex
institutions.45 It has repeatedly warned lower courts not to
overstep the lines of judicial and federal propriety, framing
its admonitions in terms of both separation of powers and
federalism concerns.46
43. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231 (2003). Resnik contends that “the
majority has rejected conceptions of a ‘cooperative partnership’ between judges
and Congress, sharing in the undertaking of lawmaking,” but notes that the door
may still be open when the court is exercising its equitable powers in furtherance
of the public interest, as opposed to private interests. Id. at 241, 249-52; see also,
e.g., David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1235-36 (“[W]hile the Court has
not heeded calls to eliminate the structural injunction, it has imposed procedural
hurdles that substantially erode the availability of the equitable remedy.”)
(footnote omitted).
44. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983) (imposing
standing requirements for injunctive relief); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-73
(1976) (same); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (creating the Younger
abstention doctrine).
45. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351-52 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (warning lower courts against becoming “enmeshed in
the minutiae of prison operations”).
46. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004) (noting
that once a consent decree has been satisfied, responsibility must be returned to
the state and that state officials “must be presumed to have a high degree of
competence in deciding how best to discharge their governmental
responsibilities”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (striking down an
injunction as being “inordinately—indeed, wildly—intrusive” and noting that the
process by which it was developed “failed to give adequate consideration to the
views of state prison authorities”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)
(“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking . . . peculiarly within
the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. . . .
[S]eparation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”).
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The second aspect of the decline is harder to quantify and
attribute: more of a shift in the cultural Weltanschauung
than anything else, a decline in motivating philosophy as
opposed to empirical practice. Fiss describes it in relation to
Brown, which by the mid-1970s had begun “to lose its
axiomatic power.”47 Some of the factors he identifies include
the retirement of the justices originally responsible for
Brown, a societal movement away from the integrative ideals
of Brown, and “a fuller appreciation of the difficulties of
administrative injunctions.”48 As Gilles aptly puts it, there is
“a sort of sub-constitutional, extra-legal discomfort with the
role of judges in institutional reform litigation.”49 The
doctrinal developments in the case law are an inevitable
result of this culture shift, much of which is itself rooted in
separation of powers concerns.50 And legislatures themselves
have internalized and appropriated these arguments, using
them to justify inaction in the face of judicial orders.51 As one
lawmaker from Kansas recently stated, “I think the bottom
line is that you still have a constitutional issue here as to
which branch has the power of the purse. . . . And clearly that
duty lies with the legislative branch. I don’t believe that’s the
place of the court.”52
47. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149-50; cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 33 (“The battle to overthrow segregation is not the
right model for all interrelationships between federal and state and local
officials.”). Brown arguably no longer means what it once meant substantively
either. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 41, at 3-5.
48. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1149-50; cf. Horowitz, supra note 21,
at 1288 (“The use of litigation to effect change in large, complex, ongoing, public
institutions is a more hazardous venture than it is frequently made out to be.”).
49. Gilles, supra note 14, at 146.
50. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 562 (noting that “under the Constitution, the first
question to be answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the
Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan”); see also infra
text accompanying notes 179-81 (providing a fuller discussion of these concerns).
51. See, e.g., Trevor Graff & John Eligon, Court Orders Kansas Legislature to
Spend More on Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/08/us/kansas-school-spending-ruling.html?_r=0 (reporting that the Kansas
state legislature has been withholding constitutionally mandated school
payments in defiance of a court order).
52. Id.
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Quantifying the decline, to the extent it exists, is
ultimately irrelevant and unnecessary. It is sufficient to note
the existing dissatisfaction with the structural injunction as
the default means of procuring institutional reform. In many
ways, the structural injunction is no more than a straw man,
and has been nothing more for some time: the frequency with
which these cases are resolved via settlement between the
parties as opposed to trial has by now so often been stated as
to be uninteresting.53 If the desired end result is a negotiated
consent decree or other form of settlement agreement, and
the means of getting there (i.e., the relief requested) is what
detractors find offensive and arguably unnecessary for
procuring the desired end result, litigators can and should
reevaluate the relief requested.
Although this Article takes no normative stance as to the
death of the structural injunction, it urges litigators to begin
the process of estate planning. If the right to institutional
reform persists, can we identify a remedy worthy of the task
and similarly capable of providing systemic relief?
B. New Governance, Experimentalism & Multilateralism
Gerald Rosenberg has famously described the idea that
litigation alone can produce systemic change as a “hollow
hope,”54 and Stuart Scheingold has similarly decried “[t]he
myth of rights,” by which court articulation of a right is
sufficient to produce reform.55 More recent scholarship has
focused on what has arisen to take the place of traditional
litigation. This scholarship—along with the phenomenon it
explores—is often categorized as “new governance”: a shift
away from rights-claiming litigation-focused strategies
towards more experimental, multilateral, and flexible means
of reform.56
53. See infra text accompanying notes 72-80.
54. ROSENBERG, supra note 8.
55. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
5 (2d ed. 2004).

AND POLITICAL CHANGE

56. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 471, 472-74 (2004); Lobel, supra note 3, at 345-50; Douglas NeJaime, When
New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324-26 (2009).
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This Article will focus on those aspects of new governance
most relevant to institutional reform and add the following:
first, what we are seeing in the courts portends a wholesale
paradigm shift in the way public interest litigation will be
conducted in years to come, whether reformers like it or not;
second, much of this shift is hostile to structural reform, and;
third, there is still time for reformers to adapt the new
constraints to their advantage to continue to pursue
institutional change.
Some scholars contend that the decline of the structural
injunction is nothing to mourn because more democratic
solutions to the rights problem have evolved to take its place,
in the form of experimentalist problem-solving courts.57 In a
series of articles beginning in the late 1990s, Michael Dorf,
Charles Sabel, and William Simon make a compelling case
that top-down institutional reform has gradually and
increasingly been replaced by a more localized “democratic
experimentalism.”58 They identify a “Scylla of deference” and
a “Charybdis of usurpation,”59 and urge the legal system to
embrace this experimentalism as a means of addressing
broad social problems without having to resort to “judicial
exhortation and intimidation.”60
These scholars, who might properly be referred to as
“experimentalists,” offer many of the traditional critiques of
the structural injunction. They argue that the institutions
subject to traditional institutional reform have their own
internal mechanisms for accountability that the courts have
57. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20. But see,
e.g., Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101,
1142-43 (2006) (critiquing the decline of formal adjudication via delegation and
privatization and noting that access to quality adjudication is increasingly class
based).
58. Dorf, supra note 3, at 884; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3; Sabel & Simon,
Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20.
59. Dorf, supra note 3, at 882; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 393 (“[T]he
Court in practice faces a familiar Hobson’s choice. It can defer to political
decisions however arrived at, knowing that deference invites caprice and
manipulation by the lawmaker. Or it can scrutinize the decision in the light of its
balancing techniques. But this scrutiny threatens to paralyze or disqualify
democracy.”).
60. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 395.

2015]

REVIVING THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 565

disregarded without legitimacy or expertise.61 They prefer
instead the work of experimentalist courts, sometimes
referred to as problem-solving courts, which substitute
participatory administration for comprehensive top-down
reform.62 They praise the increased flexibility of these courts
and the collaboration and stakeholder participation they
enable.63 Although some experimentalist courts operate at
the trial court level, as with the newly popular drug courts,
others continue to issue injunctions, but focus more on
outputs rather than inputs.64 These new injunctions are
praised for being less intrusive, more flexible, and more
process oriented than those of old.65
In addition to experimentalism, there have been both
normative and descriptive developments on the multilateral
(as opposed to unilateral judge-centered) nature of structural
reform in both the courts and the academic commentary. The
courts have begun to press for increased involvement from
stakeholders.66 And, in contrast to the unilateral model
propagated by Fiss, commentators have both begun to
acknowledge that non-judicial players have always had a role
to play and to urge their increased involvement.
Margo Schlanger, for example, details the many nonjudicial players driving reform, such as plaintiffs’ counsel and
public interest lawyers, arguing persuasively that
“[i]nstitutional reform litigation is not a judicial movement
61. E.g., Dorf, supra note 3, at 942.
62. E.g., id. at 886.
63. E.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1020.
64. Id. at 1019 (describing cases in which courts focus on providing the parties
with “governing norms . . . that express the goals the parties are expected to
achieve . . . leav[ing] the parties with a substantial range of discretion as to how
to achieve these goals”) (emphasis omitted).
65. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1411-12 (2007) (describing “[n]ewer decrees [that] typically
avoid the ‘kitchen sink’ approach to institutional reform in favor of orders that
identify goals the defendants are expected to achieve and specify standards and
procedures for measurement of performance”).
66. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that nonparties
affected by consent decrees may collaterally attack the decrees if they were not
joined to the litigation).
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but a political practice.”67 She is representative of a group of
scholars, whom some have denominated “multilateralists,”68
who recognize that the polycentricity of the paradigmatic
case for structural reform is resolved polycentrically, with a
number of stakeholders participating and a focus on a
negotiated result.69 Experimentalists have also noted the
multilateral nature of even the traditional model of
structural reform.70 And others have argued that judges are
relatively passive even in traditional structural reform cases,
anointing instead a “controlling group—a bureaucracy
consisting of attorneys for the parties, the functionaries and
experts they bring into the negotiating room, and various
court-appointed officials such as special masters.”71
C. Other Aspects of the New Era
The emerging era of reform has several other defining
characteristics.72 First and foremost, the new reform does not
proceed with the single-minded goal of procuring a structural
67. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3, at 2036; cf. Judith Resnik,
For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 176 (2003) (describing federal judges as
“no longer heroic solo actors but part of a corporate body that has begun to
socialize the next generation of judges to be suspicious of adjudication and to
prefer negotiation”).
68. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 40, at 1028 (“Multilateralists conceptualize
institutional reform lawsuits as independent, ad hoc committees convened in a
courtroom and composed of stakeholders in a government institution—the
officials who run it, the people most affected by it, and their lawyers and
experts.”).
69. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 7; Marc
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term “litigotiation”); Susan P. Sturm,
The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 995-97 (1993) (discussing the
importance of stakeholder participation and the participation values implicated
by structural reform); Zaring, supra note 40, at 1062-72 (identifying various
repeat players).
70. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 401 (noting that in the context of
institutional reform litigation “[e]ven traditional courts often directly involve the
parties in the formulation of remedial decrees”).
71. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 118-19.
72. See id. at 117-38.
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injunction, but rather with the intention of producing
negotiated change, most often via pre-trial settlement.73 If
the defendants refuse to settle and a structural injunction is
issued, so be it and all the better, but the injunction is not the
be all and end all of litigation. The drive for injunctive relief
no longer shapes the litigation, which is brought to provide
the leverage needed to get defendants to the bargaining
table.74 The goal of litigation is not an injunction, per se, but
relief, typically procured in the form of negotiated change.
This Article contends that the conflation of the these two
conceptually separate pieces—the change sought, on the one
hand, and the injunction used as a means of getting there, on
the other—is unnecessary and should be reexamined.
Negotiated change may be procured through means other
than a request for an injunction and, where those means
would be more cost-effective and efficient, litigators should
consider utilizing them.
Michael Dorf has written that “[e]ven the most
enthusiastic defenders of structural reform litigation
recognize that courts are at best ‘sub-optimal decision
makers’ in these contexts.”75 Dorf’s observation is precisely
right. Reformers continue to file these cases not so much
because they hope for court-ordered relief as because they see
the litigation as necessary for destabilization.76 Litigators
seeking structural injunctions are fully cognizant of the
normative and practical difficulties engendered by
injunctions, but they do so regardless because the suits are
designed to drive negotiation. The mistake critics of the
structural injunction make is to think that the only
73. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 69, at 268 (referring to “the strategic pursuit
of a settlement through mobilizing the court process”); Judith Resnik, Litigating
and Settling Class Actions: The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 835, 840 (1997) [hereinafter Resnik, Litigating and Settling] (“The shared
understanding is that commencing a lawsuit is a plan to litigate or to settle a case
but is rarely a plan to try a case.”).
74. Cf. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at 148 (“The politics of rights . . . involves
the manipulation of rights rather than their realization. Rights are treated as
contingent resources which impact on public policy indirectly—in the measure,
that is, that they can aid in altering the balance of political forces.”).
75. Dorf, supra note 3, at 941-42.
76. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1020.
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judicially-driven successes are those in which the court
actually issues a structural injunction. It is the request for
the injunction—and perhaps even more importantly, the
evidence of wrong-doing exposed by the pre-filing and
discovery process—that drives defendants to the bargaining
table and that is the outcome by which success is and should
be measured.
This shift in reform strategy is part and parcel of the
settlement dynamic that pervades all of modern litigation,
both civil and criminal. In most cases, the court is never even
given the opportunity to issue the injunction.77 In addition to
the usual suspects driving settlement, there are a number of
other additional factors in this context. Schlanger, for
example, notes that “defendants who agree to a decree may
transform themselves in the eyes of the public, and even in
their own eyes, from ‘lawbreakers to law implementers.’”78
She also theorizes that the parties may believe true
institutional change more likely to result from a negotiated
settlement rather than a judicially imposed order, and that
defendants cooperate because they know settlement will
result in increased resources for their institution.79 Others
have noted that defendants may settle to avoid even more
burdensome court-imposed rules.80

77. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 928-29 (2000)
(noting that roughly 60 to 70% of civil cases settle and exploring how federal
judges came to understand their role as including the management and
settlement of cases); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 27-28 (1983) (putting the
number at closer to 90%).
78. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3, at 2012.
79. Id.; see also Zaring, supra note 40, at 1046 (“Because it is difficult to resort
to another court for relitigation of a remedial determination, and because, when
appeal is possible, those determinations are reviewed deferentially, institutional
reform litigants face powerful incentives to agree on a remedy rather than waiting
for the district court to impose one.”).
80. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 122, 167-71; Frank
M. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 983,
994 (1979).
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Second, just as the structural injunction is no longer the
centerpiece of litigation, litigation itself is no longer the
centerpiece of reform efforts.81 It is now standard practice to
treat litigation as but one of several inter-related activities,
all designed to produce institutional change.82 Litigation is
now coordinated with a host of extra-judicial activities—such
as lobbying, public education, and grassroots organizing—
explicitly intended to mutually reinforce and amplify one
another.83
Organizations like the ACLU increasingly file a lawsuit
but then also publish related reports, profile individuals
similarly situated to their named plaintiffs (or the named
plaintiffs themselves), partner with other like-minded but
non-litigating organizations, and hire lobbyists to work on
the same issues addressed by the lawsuit. The litigation itself
is but a pressure point, designed to bring political actors into
compliance, lest the litigators procure less palatable courtordered relief.84 This way of doing business is reflected in
foundation funding practices, which now pay for items like
public messaging workshops for advocates and multipronged campaigns that include litigation as just one part of
many.85
Third, although structural reform has often been driven
primarily by an elite group of repeat players (like the ACLU),
81. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife,
60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2028 (2008) (surveying public interest lawyers and noting
that “the organizational leaders . . . have been acutely aware of the limits of
litigation in securing social change”).
82. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 150-51;
Rhode, supra note 81, at 2046-48.
83. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 151;
Rhode, supra note 81, at 2028.
84. It is nevertheless a much-needed pressure point. See, e.g., Rhode, supra
note 81, at 2044 (noting that “[c]ourts may not always be the most effective
dispute resolution forums, but they are often the most accessible; they are open
as of right and can force more economically or politically powerful parties to the
bargaining table”).
85. The Michigan Campaign for Justice, for example, is a 501(c)(4) coalition
funded by Atlantic Philanthropies. About Us, MICHIGAN CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.michigancampaignforjustice.org/about_us.php (last visited May 6,
2014).
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those players increasingly work from the same playbook and
in cooperation with major law firms.86 Each of these facets is
arguably causally related to the others and together they
result in an increasingly unwieldy model case structure.
David Zaring has identified what he calls “transjudicial
administration,” wherein law spreads horizontally between
trial courts.87 Zaring argues that information is “exchanged
by repeat players who participate in multiple cases, most
commonly as counsel or expert witnesses.”88 In the context of
structural reform, repeat players now include big firms,
which routinely cooperate with non-profit organizations to
bring large class action lawsuits, lending their expertise and
resources in exchange for prestige and hands on experience
for their junior associates.89
These typically defense-side firms have in turn brought
their standard practices to their pro bono work and, indeed,
pride themselves on treating their pro bono cases in the same
way as their paying cases. Schlanger describes this dynamic
in the context of prison litigation, but it holds true in the
broader civil rights context as well. She contends that the
personnel shift towards the private bar has “fed [an] arms
race, as large-firm attorneys have followed their ordinary
large-firm ‘playbook’ to make the cases even more expensive,
more thoroughly litigated, and more complex.”90 Schlanger
observes the self-reinforcing nature of this change: “If it takes
Wilson Sonsini’s resources to litigate a prison case
86. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 81, at 2070 (reporting that four fifths of public
interest organizations reported extensive or moderate collaboration with the
private bar); cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 124
(noting that in typical structural reform litigation, “the plaintiff, usually a large
class of people, is unable to control the attorney”); Resnik, Litigating and Settling,
supra note 73, at 860 (“Everyone is an interested actor in this story—litigants,
lawyers, guardians ad litem, special masters, court-appointed experts, testifying
witnesses, litigant activist groups, objectors, judges. . . . [M]any are repeat
players, whose incentives are framed by events beyond the case at hand.”).
87. Zaring, supra note 40, at 1016-17.
88. Id.
89. Rhode, supra note 81, at 2070-73.
90. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra note 37, at 616; cf. Rhode, supra note 81, at
2035-36 (describing the increasing complexity of civil rights litigation).
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successfully, there is ever more reason for inmate advocacy
groups to find law firms to take cases on.”91
It is only natural for repeat players to share stories, to
coordinate, and to model future cases upon past successes.
This tendency, combined with the involvement of large firms,
has resulted in an increasingly cumbersome form of public
interest litigation, wherein months and sometimes years of
pre-filing research culminates in a lengthy complaint seeking
every type of relief possible. The standard law firm model of
litigation is a belt and suspenders model, in which one cannot
conceive of not requesting a type of relief that might be
granted, i.e., in which the pleadings will inevitably contain a
request for both declaratory and injunctive relief.92
Structural reformers have had great success with this
model, partnering with the same group of law firms
repeatedly, and filing the same types of cases. The difficulty
with this expansive and expensive model of litigation—
however thorough, admirable, and successful—is that it has
undoubtedly contributed to the decline in structural reform.
As the cases have increased in size and complexity, it can
become daunting even to conceive of filing one: those with the
resources to file can often manage only one such case at a
time, and those seeking pro bono counsel find potential
partners wary of taking on such a large commitment,
particularly in tougher economic times.
III. AN OLD REMEDY FOR A NEW ERA
We should breathe new life into the declaratory
judgment. It is uniquely suited to filling the gaps in
structural reform left by the decline of the injunction and the
rise of experimentalism, and at the same time responsive to
the same anxieties that have created and shaped these gaps.
Every age has its neuroses and the declaratory judgment
seems almost specially tailored for ours, capable of providing
market-driven reform as opposed to court-ordered regulated
remedies. It is, moreover, also a powerful litigation tool that
91. Schlanger, Civil Rights, supra, note 37, at 620-21.
92. For a discussion of how this dynamic has played out in the indigent defense
reform context, see infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
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has to date been overlooked, capable of streamlining
litigation and reducing resource consumption while at the
same time providing much-needed institutional reform.93
A. Reconsidering & Repurposing the Declaratory Judgment
Civil rights reformers typically request declaratory relief
only in addition to injunctive relief, and courts in turn
typically issue declarations only in conjunction with
injunctions. The “better safe than sorry” approach makes a
certain amount of sense from a litigator’s perspective;94 the
Declaratory Judgments Act explicitly permits the issuance of
a declaration “whether or not further relief is or could be
sought;”95 and early advocates of declaratory relief, like
Professor Edwin Borchard, advocated this type of pleading as
well.96 This Article urges reformers to rethink this strategy
because it squanders the unique advantages of declaratory
relief. Contrary to the popular belief that a plaintiff has
“much to gain and nothing to lose by asking [for a
declaration],” more is not always better.97
The classic use of the declaratory judgment is to provide
relief where a potential wrong has not yet occurred (and
therefore injunctive relief is not available).98 The harm
addressed is the uncertainty associated with not knowing

93. As Fiss puts it in his casebook on injunctions, “[t]he declaratory judgment
has failed to achieve its potential.” OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN,
INJUNCTIONS 172 (2d ed. 1984).
94. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275,
1322 (2010) [hereinafter Bray, Preventive Adjudication] (noting the “superfluous
use of the declaratory judgment is now common practice”).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
96. Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural
Reform II, 28 YALE L.J. 105, 105-06 (1918).
97. Id. at 106.
98. As Borchard puts it, “[t]he court, in effect, by refusing an injunction informs
the prospective victim that the only way to determine whether the suspect is a
mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it.” Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R.
5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 75-76
(1928); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45
HARV. L. REV. 793 passim (1932).
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whether an injury would occur,99 and they provide what
Samuel Bray calls preventive adjudication: adjudication that
seeks an opinion not accompanied by a remedial order, that
is prospective in nature, and that applies the law to a
particular set of facts.100 It has typically been sought on its
own, independent of a request for an injunction, only to
resolve discrete problems, such as patent infringement or an
action to quiet title. When requested in the context of
structural reform, it is typically an afterthought: an
addendum to the real prize of a structural injunction.
This Article focuses on using the declaratory judgment
where injunctive relief is available, either because the wrong
is imminent or on-going, but nevertheless not preferable,
because it is not the most efficient or effective means of
pursuing relief.101 It advocates the use of the declaratory
judgment to serve the purpose that traditional injunctive
relief does, to address on-going and/or imminent harm, and
to achieve structural reform.102

99. One of the main advantages of the declaratory judgment is its use for those
who wish to establish the legality (or illegality) of conduct in which they would
like to engage. This scenario typically arises where the plaintiff seeks a
declaration in federal court that a state statute under which prosecution is
anticipated is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
100. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1277-78.
101. This way of using the declaratory judgment is akin to the type of offensive
deterrent remedy described by Daniel Meltzer, who notes the importance of such
remedies when confronted by the “distinctive problems of preventing misconduct
by public officials in an era of large government institutions.” Meltzer, supra note
18, at 278.
102. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1279-80 (describing
remedial adjudication as involving “an injury that has already happened (or will
happen imminently)”). Bray is concerned about the use of preventive adjudication
before the harm becomes imminent (at which point injunctive relief is available).
Id. at 1285-86. This Article contemplates its use after the harm has already
commenced, but is on-going. There is thus no concern that the declaratory
judgment is an advisory opinion, the issuance of which is flatly prohibited by the
Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that an “actual controversy” exist. 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,
239-42 (1937) (noting that the Act requires a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment).
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Declarations remain distinct from injunctions even
where both may be available. As Fiss puts it,
[t]he injunction consists of a declaration of rights and duties backed
by threat of sanction. It gives the defendant one more chance. The
declaratory judgment, on the other hand, gives the defendant two
more chances: it consists of a declaration of rights and duties, and
if the defendant disobeys the plaintiff cannot get a contempt order,
but only an injunction to prevent another act of disobedience. 103

Declarations are similar in temperament to what Fiss
has called the “preventive injunction,” or an injunction that
orders the defendant to stop doing a particular thing (e.g.,
“stop discriminating”).104 They are also at least theoretically
easier to procure than an injunction, as there is no need to
demonstrate a lack of an adequate remedy at law or
irreparable harm.105
Although some of the types of wrong-doing may be
amenable to a preventive injunction (e.g., stop searching
students without reasonable suspicion) others are much less
easily so addressed (e.g., end mass incarceration). More
complex problems require more complex remedies, but they
do not necessarily require more complex requests for relief.
Reformers, courts, and scholars have largely assumed that
complex remedies must be delivered via a request for a
structural injunction (that then typically results in a
settlement agreement) that regulates the various systemic
inputs and/or outputs to obtain the desired result.106
This Article contends that similar results can be obtained
with purely declaratory relief. It may be sufficient, in other
words, for the court merely to declare that the current
situation is unconstitutional to prompt the negotiation over
reform. The remainder of this Article will lay out the relative
advantages and disadvantages of pursuing solely declaratory
relief and then explore what this relief might look like in each
103. Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1122; see also FISS & RENDLEMAN,
supra note 93, at 174 (noting that injunctions “add contempt’s bite to the
declaration’s bark”).
104. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7-8 (1978) [hereinafter FISS,
CIVIL RIGHTS].
105. See infra text accompanying notes 139-41.
106. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1019-20.
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of the major life stages of a reform action. As in real life,
success will largely be measured by the extent to which
defendants are persuaded to negotiate change; just as the
request for an injunction can be decoupled from the
negotiated reform, so too can the request for a declaration.
B. A Strong Separationist Approach
Declaratory judging is eminently suited to producing
structural reform in a way that even the most ardent
proponents of judicial minimalism and separation of powers
should feel comfortable with.107 This Article will refer to these
positions generally as “separationist” in nature. There are
two strands to the separationist philosophy, one weak and
the other strong. The weak version argues that decisions
about restructuring institutions will eventually be made by
the political branches regardless of the type of litigation relief
sought or granted. The strong version argues that there are
a variety of institutional and structural reasons why the
political branches should be making these decisions instead
of the courts. This Section will focus upon the merits of
declaratory relief relative to the strong version.
Separationists argue in favor of judicial restraint for a
variety of reasons. First, there are those who believe that
judicial minimalism promotes democracy. Cass Sunstein, for
example, urges “breathing space” for the political process and
argues that judicially mandated reform is simply less
democratic than reform that arises from the political
branches.108 In this telling, judicial minimalism is both
“democracy-forcing” and related to legitimacy.109 The less
107. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (arguing that “the inquiry
of federal courts into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether
a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution or, in the case of
a federal prison, a statute”).
108. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 19-20; see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 45-46 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING]; cf. Dorf, supra note 3, at 892 (describing “[t]he often praised but
rarely practiced philosophy of judicial restraint [as] a relatively close cousin of
radical democracy”).
109. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 7; cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S.
1, 10 (1973) (“It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of
governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the
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judges do, the more the political branches are empowered to
do, creating space for the democratic process, which is both
more inclusive and produces a better outcome.110 One might
also contend that the increased transparency afforded by the
political process (as opposed to injunctions and consent
decrees) is beneficial to democracy as well.111
Second, many have identified the gap created by
structural injunctions between what is constitutionally
required to protect rights and what courts actually order
defendants to do, noting that this problem increases with the
specificity of the injunctive language.112 It is often difficult to
firmly ground the individual provisions of structural

political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the
electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence.”).
110. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 19; see also SANDLER &
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 172 (“The annals of democracy by
decree are full of cases in which defendants consented to a decree in order to avoid
responsibility for politically difficult choices or to evade constitutional
requirements for legislative action.”); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and
the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (“The
substitution of government by the federal judiciary for local self-government
involves dangerous disproportionality; it sacrifices fundamental democratic
values in order to vindicate particular constitutional rights.”).
111. Cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 199-200, 21619 (proposing to increase the transparency and formality of consent decrees);
Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the
Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515,
515 (2010) [hereinafter Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation] (noting that
“notwithstanding the individual and collective importance of . . . injunctions, they
languish in practical obscurity, unavailable to all but the extraordinarily
persevering researcher who joins inside information with abundant funds”).
112. Nagel, supra note 110, at 708-10; see also SANDLER & SCHOENBROD,
DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 102 (arguing that judges have used structural
reform to pursue “aspirational goals” rather than enforce rights); Fletcher, supra
note 16, at 652-54 (noting the “distorting effect of the court’s power to order an
affirmative remedy in the absence of an agreement among the parties” on
settlement negotiations); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 955-58 (1978); cf. Meltzer, supra note 18, at 249
(identifying “deterrent remedies” as “those in which the litigant obtains more
than he is entitled to, when measured against the harm to his rights that he has
suffered or is likely to suffer in the future”).
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injunctions in concrete constitutional requirements.113
Separationists delight in pointing out, for example, the court
orders requiring that the temperature in a prison not exceed
a certain temperature or that inmates be allotted a minimum
particular square footage.114
Third, separationists typically contend that judges are
less competent than the political branches to enact
institutional reform. This criticism heightens when the
injunction sought will inevitably be costly to implement and
enforce. Separationists contend that these problems are
polycentric because court-required expenditures may impact
other programs and institutions not before the court and/or
require tax increases.115 The idea is that courts are illequipped to consider these external impacts and their
institutional competency suffers in relation to that of the
political branches accordingly.116 This argument is related to
the criticism that court cases almost always fail to consult all
the impacted or relevant parties, some of whom may surface
after the litigation has concluded and an injunction
implemented.117 Relatedly, others have argued that at least
113. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (“Courts must be mindful that
these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers
to them must reflect that fact rather than a court’s idea of how best to operate a
detention facility.”).
114. See, e.g., id. at 541-43; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 711-14 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 96-97 (1976). Fiss’s response is that although the
Constitution does not say anything about the temperatures of showers, “it does
say something about equality and humane treatment, and a court trying to give
meaning to those values may find it both necessary and appropriate—as a way of
bringing the organization within the bounds of the Constitution—to issue
directives on these matters.” Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 50.
115. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 21, at 591 (contrasting a “Rights Maximizing”
approach with an “Interest Balancing” approach); Horowitz, supra note 21, at
1305 (noting that “[c]ourts operate one case at a time. They never need lay prison
needs against welfare needs, because they work on the premise that they are
declaring rights. If a party has a right, it is not bounded by cost.”); Nagel, supra
note 110, at 710-11 (advocating the minimization of such judicial remedies with
“third-party consequences”).
116. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 16, at 648-49.
117. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1291-95 (describing “five assumptions
typically indulged by the courts—and often incorrectly,” that the plaintiffs are
homogenous, that the defendant organizations have a coherent structure, “that
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some of the problems reformers have sought to address via
structural reform are really resource problems, not rights
problems, and therefore perhaps not problems for the courts
at all.118
Finally, there is arguably a heightened separationist
concern where a federal court seeks to take over a
traditionally state run institution, such as a school system or
state prison.119
The traditional response to the separationists is to say
they have missed the whole point of structural reform, which
is inherently countermajoritarian.120 Given the decline of the
structural injunction and the increasing sway separationist
arguments appear to have on courts (and the Court), this
response is no longer sufficient as a practical matter,
however theoretically persuasive it may be. The approach
urged by this Article seeks to address the separationist
concerns more transparently while at the same time
providing a practical mechanism for reformers to use to
achieve the desired level of institutional change.
Use of declaratory judgments in the way this Article
advocates is largely an exercise in judicial minimalism, but
without many of the drawbacks to minimalism that Sunstein
identifies: it does not threaten rule of law values, it does not
the relevant organizations are before the court,” that the defendant organizations
have consistent interests, and “that plaintiffs and defendants are on opposite
sides of the case”); cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that
nonparties affected by consent decrees may collaterally attack the decrees if they
were not joined to the litigation).
118. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1289.
119. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that factors contributing to school desegregation “are best
addressed by the representative branches” and citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977)); Milliken, 433 U.S. at 281 (admonishing federal courts to “take
into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs”).
120. See, e.g., FISS, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 104, at 60 (arguing that in the
context of the civil rights injunction, “the nonrepresentative quality of the
judiciary becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Constitutional rights are supposed
to be countermajoritarian . . . .”); see also Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307-11
(identifying other responses to the separationist argument); Fiss, 1978 Term,
supra note 2, at 15, 32-35 (same).
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produce unfairness through dissimilar treatment of the
similarly situated, and there is no indication that the types
of issues relevant to this discussion are those that are “ill
suited to democratic choice, either because [they] should be
off-limits to politics or because democratic deliberation is not
functioning well”—to the extent the latter is true, the point
of the declaration is to prompt the efficacious use of
democratic deliberation to arrive at a solution to a problem
some stakeholders were perhaps resistant to recognizing.121
There is a strong argument in favor of judicial
minimalism in cases of moral uncertainty.122 This Article
contends that minimalism is actually also (or even more)
called for not just in these hard cases, but in the big ones as
well, in which the declaration of rights is not particularly
difficult (or morally uncertain) and part of the issue is not
rapidly changing circumstances but circumstances that have
stayed the same for too long.123
Finally, with regard to the federalist flavor of the
separationist concern, a declaratory judgment will often be
less intrusive on state sovereignty than an injunction,
offering the federal court confronted with a request to
overhaul a state institution a remedy that respects comity
but reserves authority.124 Declarations may be drafted
broadly and injunctions may be drafted narrowly, but the use
of the declaration as advocated by this Article—to prod the
responsible political entities to reform—should generally
speaking, be less objectionable from a states’ rights
121. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 29.
122. Cf. id. at 30.
123. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1284 (noting that
“[a]sking for only declaratory relief when more is available may perhaps be useful
in public law cases, where courts are sometimes reticent or constrained in giving
monetary or injunctive relief”).
124. Where abstention doctrine applies to injunctive relief, it will also apply to
declaratory relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 & n.2 (1971); Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.
922, 931 (1975) (“At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state
statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the interests of a
federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger
injunctive medicine will be unnecessary.”).
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perspective.125 A less coercive sanction may also be easier to
swallow, particularly when it is one that provides flexibility
and requires stakeholder participation in crafting a
solution.126 And, of course, there is no change from the status
quo where a negotiated settlement results.
C. Efficiency, Efficiency, Efficiency: A Weak Separationist
Approach
The real role of litigation in the new era of public interest
reform is to prod a negotiated settlement and it is
unnecessary to seek injunctive relief to do so.127 Seeking such
relief also contributes to needless inefficiency in the litigation
process.128 If the eventual result of nearly all institutional
reform litigation is negotiated settlement, that litigation
should be structured as efficiently as possible. Furthermore,
if an injunction is unlikely to result even in the event of a
successful litigation (because the parties settled) and seeking
an injunction is likely to complicate and prolong the
litigation, litigators should seek relief that both avoids those
complications and can still result either in the very same
settlement or ultimate institutional change comparable to
that which would be provided by an injunction.
The model of declaratory judging described above offers
three main sources of efficiency and cost savings, not just for
125. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1239 (1988) (noting that “an injunction may often be more intrusive on
traditional state sovereign prerogatives than a declaratory judgment”).
126. Cf. Lobel, supra note 3, at 391.
127. Some experimentalists have described the process of structural reform as
one of “destabilization,” in which a previously unaccountable institution is forced
(or encouraged) to change its ways. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization,
supra note 6, at 1056; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY:
ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 550
(Verso 2004) (1987). The idea is that the litigation process “induces the institution
to reform itself in a process in which it must respond to previously excluded
stakeholders.” Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1056; see also id.
at 1020 (“Destabilization rights are claims to unsettle and open up public
institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are
substantially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability.”).
128. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1056.
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would-be reformers, but for defendants and the courts as
well. Because it does not appear that anyone has actually
ever filed a case seeking structural reform via solely
declaratory relief, they are presented below from least to
most speculative.
First, the declaratory judging model recognizes, whether
as a normative or a descriptive matter, that the subject
matter of institutional reform cases will end up before the
political branches sooner or later because that is where the
money is. From a descriptive perspective, the actual work of
reforming an institution takes place only with the
participation of the political branches and administrative
agencies ultimately responsible for procuring funding for the
institution, implementing new systems and controls, and
complying with court orders or negotiated agreements.129 The
declaratory judgment prods those government actors to act
sooner rather than later, with additional court action
threatened should their solutions prove unsatisfactory to the
plaintiff class.
From a normative separationist perspective, declaratory
judgments are firmly sited within the core competences of the
courts in a way that structural injunctions are not.
Declaratory judgments ask courts to declare actions lawful or
unlawful, applying well-defined legal standards to a set of
facts.130 In contrast to the traditional model of the structural
injunction, which envisions an on-going dialogue between the
court and the parties, the declaratory relief model envisions
a dialogue between the parties and the political branches
(after an introductory statement made by the court).131
129. Cf. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 55, at 5.
130. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1304 (“The courts have a comparative
advantage when it comes to adjudicating rights; they have none when it comes to
enforcing complex remedies.”); Edson R. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized
Legal Advisers of the People, 54 AM. L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1920).
131. Cf. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1333 (“Preventive
adjudication may foster democratic values, because by speaking sotto voce a court
can engage in a dialogue with the legislative or executive branch about remedial
choices.”); Fiss, Dombrowski, supra note 10, at 1144 (“An administrative decree
requires a long continuing relationship between the equity court and the parties,
in which initial directives are modified in light of changed conditions or new
insights.”).
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Following a court’s declaration of rights, which serves as the
baseline below which defendants may not fall, the various
stakeholders are left to work out the details.132
The use of strategically escalated court involvement has
ample support in the precedent. For example, in Hutto v.
Finney,133 the Court approved the imposition of a maximum
limit on the number of days inmates could spend in solitary
confinement, noting that the lower court had first given the
state department of corrections a number of chances to fix the
problem.134 Similarly, in Bounds v. Smith,135 another prison
reform case, the Court stated that the “courts below
scrupulously respected the limits on their role” by initially
holding only that a constitutional guarantee had been
violated and ordering defendants to devise a remedy
themselves.136
It can be difficult even for relatively ardent
separationists to conceive of structural reform without the
active and central participation of the judge.137 Some
commentators have suggested ways in which judges can
incentivize behavior change within the litigation framework
that stop short of a complex structural injunction. William
Fletcher notes, for example, that courts can use options that
range from soliciting acceptable plans from the parties and
permitting the defendant to choose among them, to threatening
132. Cf. Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court, Democracy and
Institutional Reform Litigation, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 933 (2005)
[hereinafter Sandler & Schoenbrod, The Supreme Court] (advocating a similar
approach, but in the context of “soft rights”).
133. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
134. Id. at 687; see also id. (“[T]aking the long and unhappy history of the
litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order
to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance.”); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (explaining that although state and local authorities have
primary responsibility for curing constitutional violations, the courts may act
when they fail to meet that obligation).
135. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
136. Id. at 832-33.
137. See, e.g., SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 193-221
(proposing new principles to guide structural reform, nearly all of which are
judge-centered).
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contempt if a defendant refuses to choose and implement an
acceptable plan, to threatening to close a prison facility or to release
prisoners if the state refuses to improve conditions, and even to
threatening to appoint a receiver.138

The declaratory judgment is less intrusive than even
these options, though perhaps closest in temperament to the
threat of contempt, and far less judge-centered.
Second, for a variety of doctrinal reasons, there is reason
to believe that should the parties be unable to settle,
declaratory judgments would be easier to procure than
injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seeking solely declaratory relief
face a lower burden than plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.
As the Court noted in Steffel, “engrafting upon the
Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that all of the
traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an
injunction be satisfied before the issuance of a declaratory
judgment is considered would defy Congress’ intent to make
declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction
would be inappropriate.”139 There is no requirement to
demonstrate irreparable injury, as there is for injunctive
relief,140 or a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate no
adequate remedy at law.141
Relatedly, because structural injunctions cost money to
implement, defendants often raise immunity and separation
of powers defenses.142 Although the Court has held that court
orders requiring expenditures to be made do not violate
sovereign immunity principles, defendants often contend
that they do.143 Even if defendants fail (sometimes
138. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 695.
139. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974); see also Fiss, Dombrowski,
supra note 10, at 1123 (noting that the declaratory judgment is a statutory
creation, “not moored to the history of equity”).
140. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471-72; see also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73-74
(1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
141. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471-72; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 57 (“The existence of
another adequate remedy does not preclude a declaratory judgment that is
otherwise appropriate.”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1264, at 2 (1934).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
143. See id.
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repeatedly) to prevail on these issues, they often succeed in
tying up structural reform litigation for years as questions of
whether there was an adequate remedy at law, or whether
the relief sought would violate separation of powers
principles, are resolved by the courts.144 Where only
declaratory relief is sought, it may be easier for plaintiffs and
the courts to assuage separation of powers concerns.
Finally, the mechanics of litigating a declaratory
judgment action should result in monetary cost-savings.
William Landes and Richard Posner observe that declaratory
judgments require an investment of resources only to
determine liability, not to craft a remedy or quantify
damages.145 They conclude that “[i]f the losing party will
comply once the issue of liability is authoritatively resolved,
he—in fact, both parties, plus the court—can economize on
the expense of litigation by seeking only declaratory relief.”146
To be fair, the cost savings may more accurately be
described as a cost shifting. Unlike the cases on which
Landes and Posner focus, which are primarily insurance
related and judicial review of administrative action cases,
institutional reform cases require extensive investment in
remedy crafting after the litigation over liability is resolved.
That investment, however, is arguably reduced by removing
the obstructionist incentives inherent to the litigation
dynamic and likely borne by parties more appropriate than
the court system. The remedies devised may also be more
likely to procure real compliance and change.147 From a more
separationist view, declaratory judgments also result in costsavings for the courts because they are no longer needed to

144. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
145. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory
Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 699 (1994).
146. Id.
147. Cf. SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 105 (arguing
that consent decrees seek to enforce “soft rights” and “often call for performance
whose adequacy is difficult to judge” whereas “[o]fficials can often comply with
traditional rights by just not doing what is forbidden”).
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devise and enforce remedies or to remain involved for years
on end.148
Furthermore, as others have noted, consent decrees and
structural injunctions, not to mention settlement
agreements, are not paragons of transparency.149 It can be
difficult for anyone beyond the immediate litigating parties
and the specific additional stakeholders invited to participate
to figure out how exactly a case was resolved, what precise
legal principles were applied by the court, and what
defendants agreed to do going forward.150 To the extent that
there is transnational adjudication in this context, there is a
vast information asymmetry that affects primarily
defendants, who are far less likely to be repeat players than
plaintiffs’ counsel. Ironically, the information asymmetry has
adverse effects for plaintiffs’ counsel and their future clients,
because it forces them to relitigate issues with other
defendants down the line.
There will always be defendants who insist on receiving
their own day in court, but there are undoubtedly others who
may be persuaded to reform if presented with a broader
declaration of rights that clearly applies to them.151 A
statement that x practice violates y right is arguably more
transferrable and of greater practical import to litigators
than a specific structural injunction that applies only to one
particular situation. In some circumstances, it may even be
possible to leverage this aspect of the declaratory judgment
to circumvent the need for a class action altogether.152

148. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 1297, 1302.
149. See, e.g., Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation, supra note 111, at 516-18.
150. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 756
(2012) [hereinafter Bray, Announcing Remedies] (noting the cost-saving benefits
of announced remedies “because determining the remedy once is cheaper than
determining it over and over again”).
151. Cf. id. at 770 (describing the effects of “meta-announcement,” in which “an
announced remedy communicates not only what the remedy will be but also that
the remedy will be the same for everyone”) (emphasis omitted).
152. Gary F. Smith & Nu Usaha, Dusting Off the Declaratory Judgment Act: A
Broad Remedy for Classwide Violations of Federal Law, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
112, 112-13 (July-Aug. 1998) (proposing that legal aid lawyers barred from class
action practice use the declaratory judgment to obtain relief).
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D. Beyond Experimentalism
This Article presents a different path around the Scylla
and Charybdis, one that is arguably even less interventionist
than
the
court-centered
variant
of
democratic
experimentalism and yet better suited to situations that
demand structural reform. It contends that at least in the
context of the paradigmatic structural reform case—
involving an institutional failure to meet legal standards that
is both big and polycentric—democratic experimentalism is
simply insufficient to solve the problem. But the criticisms of
structural injunctions remain, and so the question for
reformers is how to fill the gap left by their decline even as
we accept the changes that democratic experimentalism has
wrought.
The comments below are intended more to demonstrate
the inherent shortcomings of experimentalism when there is
a case for structural reform than to argue that
experimentalism is ill-advised as an enterprise altogether;
experimentalism remains a worthy endeavor, but can never
satisfy all of our reform needs.
First, experimentalism is at once insufficiently courtcentered and overly so, advocating deference and outside
participation when the court’s expertise is arguably at its
greatest—in the liability stage—and court participation
when its expertise is arguably at its lowest—at the remedy
stage.153 The model of declaratory judging advocated by this
Article flips this dynamic of judicial involvement to take
advantage of core institutional competencies. Courts are
asked to retain responsibility for determining liability,
applying law to facts, but are asked to step back from the
responsibility of structuring remedies.
Courts are indisputably within their core area of
expertise when they evaluate a factual situation to determine
whether rights have been violated. That expertise arguably
diminishes when they seek to remedy the rights violation by
153. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 3, at 401 (“Experimentalism . . . asks courts to
involve the parties in exploring the realm of possibilities at the earlier stage of
determining whether there is a legal violation. For trial courts, experimentalism
can transform the role of the judge from the traditional Anglo-American model of
passive referee into an active problem solver . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
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reforming the institution at fault. Declaratory judging asks
courts to remain well within their core area of expertise and
defer to the parties (and other stakeholders) on the actual
task of institutional reform—and, of course, should the
judgment prove insufficient, motivation to halt the rights
violations, the model provides for a another bite at the
apple.154
Second, experimentalism is (by design) ill-suited to
providing wholesale, as opposed to retail, reform. Local
change at an individual level may be appropriate,
particularly where the problem confronted is “hard” in the
sense that there is no clear doctrinal answer. But where the
problem is “big” but less “hard”—as is the case with much of
the institutional reform needed today, particularly in the
context of racial justice—more wide-ranging relief is
appropriate: these problems are by their very nature
difficult, if not impossible, to tackle via one-off, individual
litigation.
Experimentalism is not unsuited for all aspects of
structural reform—where the issues are both big and hard,
where the doctrinal answers are unclear, and where both law
and society are unsettled, the approach suggested by the
experimentalists may make sense.155 But it is unnecessary
and ill-suited for big cases that are not very difficult.
Experimentalism as applied to those cases responds on a
scale that is at once too large and too small, offering
widespread court involvement but on an individual level,
complaint by complaint, court case by court case. In contrast,
declaratory judgments offer larger scale involvement on the
group level but less overall involvement by courts, in the form
of one declaration of liability for defendants’ actions affecting
a class of people, which is then leveraged to generate the

154. Dorf in fact identifies a place for this type of solution, noting that there is
a version of the judicial/legislative dialogue “solution that bears a substantial
resemblance to experimentalism . . . . A court might find that some challenged
law or practice violates constitutional or other legal norms and order the
legislature to adopt some solution, without specifying the precise contours of that
solution.” Dorf, supra note 3, at 978.
155. Cf. Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 7-8.
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political accountability necessary to create a practical
solution.
The experimentalist reply is to sing the praises of judicial
modesty.156 The point of this Section is to suggest that judicial
modesty also has a price, and it is one that rises in proportion
to the size and intractability of the root institutional problem.
Problem-solving courts offer retail-level solutions to
individuals and the relief is either retrospective or designed
to help a criminal defendant navigate through their
prosecution, as in the case of drug courts. They are illequipped to provide wholesale solutions to class-wide
problems, and wholly unequipped to provide prospective
relief.157 Even the large-scale experimentalism that Sabel and
Simon cite with approval, such as consent decrees providing
for out-put oriented benchmarks rather than in-put oriented
oversight, is the result of large-scale litigation in which
plaintiffs’ counsel committed vast institutional resources
long
after
the
original
named
plaintiffs
were
deinstitutionalized.158 In contrast to experimentalism,
declaratory judgments can produce wholesale, as opposed to
retail, sorting, accommodating class-based relief across a
broad spectrum of institutional practices.159
Third, the experimentalist model envisions (and indeed,
places a premium upon) multilateral stakeholder
participation, but is not particularly effective when it comes
to actually ensuring that all stakeholders have an equal place
at the table. Persons whose rights have been violated by an
institution are often unable, unwilling, or unsuited to
156. Dorf, supra note 3, at 942 (“A problem-solving court faces fewer competency
obstacles than a court overseeing structural reform because the former does not
itself run any institutions, nor does it place itself atop a hierarchical organization
of personnel resentful of its authority.”).
157. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive
Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1216 (2000).
158. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1028 (citing with approval
the consent decree in a case in which the parties litigated for more than two
decades over defendants’ repeated failures to comply with the law).
159. Cf. Bray, Preventative Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1317-18 (contending
that federal courts issuing declaratory relief participate in retail sorting, which
results in “less judicial expertise, less accessibility to low-income plaintiffs, and
more forum shopping. These drawbacks may help explain the seemingly
moribund condition of the federal declaratory judgment.”).

2015]

REVIVING THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 589

bringing about institutional reform. To the extent these
individuals are the subject of litigation, it is usually because
they are being prosecuted, as in the case of drug courts and
other experimental trial-level court systems. The facts
presented by the paradigmatic case for structural reform
involve institutions with sufficient control over a group of
people to be able to violate their rights.
The persons affected, like prison inmates or students,
necessarily have less power over their lives than others and,
by extension, less of the leverage needed to bring those who
run the institution to the bargaining table. There is little
incentive to bring institutionalized persons to the bargaining
table in the absence of litigation that they themselves have
initiated as plaintiffs. A political process attempting to
restructure prison practices, for example, is less likely to
bring inmates to the negotiating table than it is to bring other
institutional stakeholders. Plaintiff initiated litigation is still
needed to enable the participation of these most essential
stakeholders.
The declaratory judgment model recognizes that the
stakeholders in the types of cases at hand are typically (and
often literally) disenfranchised and that their needs are often
served by organizations that have the resources needed to
bring suit on their behalf, such as those dedicated to
disability rights or civil liberties. This mediated participation
may be of even greater importance where there is public
resistance to direct participation by the stakeholders at
issue.160
E. Some Disadvantages
Despite the myriad advantages described above, the
declaratory judgment has been under-utilized in the context
of civil rights reform. Plenty of lawsuits seek it, but only in
conjunction with injunctive relief, eviscerating its true value.
There are a number of reasons this is likely the case, but this
Article contends a combination of risk adversity, inertia, and
optimism is at work. Litigators seeking structural reform
160. Sabel & Simon, Destabilization, supra note 6, at 1037 (acknowledging the
strong “public resistance to participation in policymaking and administration by
prisoners and their advocates”).
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have taken insufficient notice of the increased reluctance of
courts to issue sweeping structural injunctions and fear
having to relitigate cases in the event that defendants defy a
declaratory judgment; they ask for both types of relief
because they and everyone they know have always done so
and they believe that it is always possible the court will issue
the structural injunction of their dreams. This Article urges
close reconsideration of this dynamic.
Seeking solely declaratory relief in civil rights cases is, of
course, not without its downsides, only some of which are
predictable at this moment. If and when plaintiffs’ counsel
begin to bring these types of cases, defendants and courts will
have a hand in shaping the challenges they will face and a
new litigation dynamic will inevitably result. And some
aspects of the old dynamic will remain unchanged, as there
is only so much the declaratory judgment can do. The usual
rules on abstention will still apply, for example, as will the
various restrictions governing standing.161
First and foremost, seeking solely declaratory relief will
likely result in the relitigation of at least some cases.
Declaratory judgments may be binding in subsequent
litigation only if the same plaintiff is involved, and, if
defendants disregard the declaration issued, plaintiffs must
return to the court for an injunction.162 These wrinkles are
problems presented by what we might call the bad-faith
defendant. Should the plaintiffs return to court, they may of
course procure an injunction, but at the expense of additional
litigation costs and, on top of that, the facts to which the court
previously applied the law will likely have shifted by the time
the non-compliance has been ascertained.
Plaintiffs seeking an injunction will functionally need to
rebuild their case on the basis of these new facts, many of
which will be the result of changes in the defendants’
behavior and thus calculated to reduce or eliminate liability.
Defendants may defy a declaration insofar as they refuse to
fully comply with legal norms, but adjust their behavior just
enough to make it harder for plaintiffs to argue that they are
161. See supra notes 44 & 124 and accompanying text.
162. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989).
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still in non-compliance.163 This is not a new phenomenon,
however, as structural reform defendants are always free to
adjust their behavior at any point during the life of a lawsuit
prior to settlement or judgment regardless of the type of relief
sought. If the adjustment is sufficiently significant, the need
for further proceedings may be mooted. More often, when it
is not, plaintiffs must adjust their litigation posture and
invest resources in additional discovery, new expert reports,
etc.
Another disadvantage to declaratory relief is that the
reform implemented may not be as sweeping as that which a
court would issue. As noted above, some commentators have
identified a gap between what the law requires and what
structural injunctions require.164 This disparity may be a
problem from a separationist perspective, but reformers are
presumably more than happy to take advantage. When the
outcome is reform via negotiated settlement, there is no
functional difference, but where a judgment is actually
issued, the declaratory judgment model may result in
narrower solutions because they will be the result of political
bargaining and not judicially imposed.
The bargaining process will also differ from the
settlement negotiation process because more stakeholders
will likely be involved, further muddying the waters and
introducing competing resource needs—the prison official
may now be at the same table with the school official,
competing for the same limited pot of resources. However, it
is equally likely that where the judge is a separationist,
judicially or ideologically conservative, or otherwise hostile
to reformers’ claims, the declaratory judgment model can
make reform more likely to take place and result in broader
reform than the law would require because the political
parties are free to make new law where the judge is not.

163. See, e.g., Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 55 (noting the problem of forcing
judges to choose “between a heavy and frequent use of criminal contempt power
or an endless series of declarations of what was unacceptable”); cf. Bray,
Preventative Adjudication, supra note 94, at 1295 (noting that “the resolution of
fact-based indeterminacy has less preclusive or precedential force [because] the
parties are not locked in: they have time to change their conduct”).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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The resultant uncertainty may be discomfiting to some,
but the process envisioned by this Article is one in which the
substantive bargaining process is largely the same as in that
produced by the traditional lawsuit seeking both an
injunction and a declaration, just a bargaining process that
the parties are able to arrive at in a more expeditious
manner. As with new governance, this model of litigation and
negotiation requires some amount of “optimis[m] about
uncertainty and doubt.”165
Finally, just as there are some doctrinal advantages to
seeking solely declaratory relief, the law also imposes at least
one major doctrinal handicap. The ability of plaintiffs’
counsel to secure attorneys fees may be compromised.166 This
factor is obviously relevant, but should not be critical. Since
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources,167 plaintiffs’
counsel have been unable to recover attorneys fees under
Section 1988 and other federal statutes as the “prevailing
party” under the theory that their lawsuit was merely a
catalyst for change.168 Although fees are still recoverable in
the event a consent decree is entered, most structural reform
cases settle well before that takes place and therefore would
not be amenable to fees collection anyway. Perhaps relatedly,
because so much institutional reform litigation brought today
is initiated by well-established non-profits who receive
foundation and private funding, as well as support from the
private bar, it is not as dependent upon attorneys fees as, for
example, individual cases filed for purely retrospective
damages relief.
IV. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN ACTION
The remainder of the Article will explore how strategic
use of the declaratory judgment action can streamline
systemic reform litigation in the real world, providing a
165. Lobel, supra note 3, at 395.
166. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (holding that a declaratory
judgment “will constitute relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if, it affects
the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff”).
167. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
168. Id. at 610.
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practical view of how the theoretical efficiencies identified
might play out. It will argue that actions seeking solely
declaratory relief should result in meaningful improvement
in four phases of litigated reform: pre-filing and claim
structuring, motions to dismiss, remedy identification and
implementation, and enforcement/deterrence.
This Part will draw from a variety of on-going areas of
structural reform, such as public defense reform, school-toprison pipeline reform, and prison reform. Rather than
second-guessing failed efforts, it will focus on cases in which
litigators actually procured reform, whether through a
settlement agreement, a consent decree, other court-ordered
relief, or as a catalyst for institutional change. It will also
take as a given the current litigation and reform environment
as described above.169 Given the undeniable success reformers
have had with the traditional model, which invariably seeks
both declaratory and injunctive relief, one might reasonably
ask why we should fix something that is not broken: because
the litigation could and should be made more streamlined
and efficient; because the cost of entry to file one of these
cases has grown almost prohibitively expensive, dissuading
advocates with fewer resources from filing anything at all;
and because these successful efforts can and should be
replicated more easily and cost-effectively.
A. Pre-filing, Claim Structuring, and Discovery
The pre-filing process is often a significant component of
structural reform, both in terms of cost, resource allocation,
and time. Plaintiffs’ counsel must typically invest significant
time and resources investigating and structuring their
claims, not to mention recruiting pro bono counsel. Where
they seek to reform a number of institutions all committing
the same rights violations at once, counsel frequently file on
behalf of persons affected by each individual institution or at
a minimum number of representative institutions. The prefiling investigation can be exhaustive (and exhausting) as
attorneys must gather information, documents, and
plaintiffs from each institution and take the additional step
of weighing which ones to actually name. In the indigent
169. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
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defense reform context, for example, litigators expend a vast
amount of resources conducting research and gathering data
in a number of counties across a given state in an effort to
demonstrate that the deficiency in services is state-wide.
A bloated claim structure results in increased costs
throughout the life of the case, in the form of more
complicated motions to dismiss (e.g., with different
defendants filing separate motions, or more defenses to raise)
and greater discovery needs (e.g., in the form of depositions
and document requests). Perhaps in part because these costs
are now largely borne by law firms, the traditional model of
litigation in some areas of structural reform is increasingly
cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming.170 For
example, public defense reform litigation filed in the last ten
years has largely hewed to a class action model that requests
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of indigent
criminal defendants who have not yet been convicted.171 The
complaint is typically an exhaustive account of all the various
shortcomings of the public defense system in question,
covering aspects like funding, supervision, training, and the
performance of indigent defense counsel.172 Relief is often
sought against a variety of defendants, and, where the state
is sued, the plaintiff class includes members from a range of

170. One description of the on-going litigation over the public defense services
provided in New York State noted that lead counsel in the case has been “assisted
by a team of dozens of lawyers at Schulte Roth & Zabel, who have committed more
than 20,000 hours to the case and absorbed more than $500,000 in expenses.”
Seth Stern, Standing up for Gideon’s Mandate, HARV. L. BULL., Winter 2014, at
46. The case was filed in 2007 and is still pending. Id.
171. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Wilbur
v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 2:11-cv-01100 RSL (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011)
[hereinafter Wilbur Complaint]; Complaint, Duncan v. State, No. 07-000242-CZ
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 2007) [hereinafter Duncan Complaint]; Amended Complaint,
White v. Martz, No. C DV-2002-133 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Apr. 14, 2002)
[hereinafter White Complaint]; Amended Class Action Complaint, HurrellHarring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2008) [hereinafter HurrellHarring Complaint]; Complaint, Flora v. Luzerne Cnty., No. 04517 (Pa. C.P. Apr.
10, 2012) [hereinafter Flora Complaint].
172. See, e.g., Wilbur Complaint, supra note 171; Duncan Complaint, supra note
171; White Complaint, supra note 171; Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note
171; Flora Complaint, supra note 171.
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counties from across the state and allegations in the
complaint include sections for each of those counties.173
One case recently filed in 2014, for example, seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of four juvenile
and four adult named plaintiffs against the state of Georgia,
the governor, a variety of state and county officials from four
counties, an array of juvenile and superior court judges,
public defenders, and district attorneys.174 The complaint,
which is eighty-three pages long (excluding exhibits), lists
four attorneys from the Southern Center for Human Rights
and eight from Arnold & Porter, LLP.175
Although much of the litigation model cannot be changed
by virtue of doctrinal necessity, a move towards a request for
solely declaratory judgment would streamline the pre-filing
and claim structuring process.176 Plaintiffs could file
litigation seeking declaratory relief with respect to only one
institution, leveraging success against that particular
institution against all other similarly situated institutions.
In the context of public defense reform, they could sue on the
basis of the facts in only one county in the state and name
only one defendant: the state. The declaration requested
could be that the state is ultimately responsible for the
provision of public defense services in that particular county
and that the services as described in that county fall below
the constitutional minimum. Although the state could then
choose to fix the system only with respect to that one
particular county, plaintiffs could and should seek to
leverage that declaration against the state with respect to all
other counties. One could imagine a similar reform structure
173. In White v. Martz, for example, plaintiffs sued seven out of Montana’s fiftysix counties. See White Complaint, supra note 171, at 1-2. In Michigan, plaintiffs
discussed three out of Michigan’s eighty-seven counties. See Duncan Complaint,
supra note 171. In New York, plaintiffs discuss the pitfalls in five of New York’s
sixty-two counties. See Hurrell-Harring Complaint, supra note 171.
174. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Darden ex rel. N.P. v.
State, No. 2014CV241025 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2014).
175. Id. at 84-85.
176. Plaintiffs will still likely want to seek class certification, for example, and
rely on extensive pleadings cataloging the various deficiencies of the system in
question.
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for prison conditions cases and, depending upon the state,
school cases.
Perhaps of greatest relevance to this calculus is the fact
that the primary goal of plaintiffs is to drive defendants to
the bargaining table. Although reformers in the public
defense context have had some victories in the form of
definitive court orders,177 most cases have been resolved by
state legislative action, sometimes even prior to the filing of
intended litigation.178 Members of the plaintiff class lack the
political leverage to spur reform in the absence of a lawsuit,
but there is no reason for the lawsuit that provides the
leverage to be as unwieldy as some of those recently filed.
B. Motions to Dismiss
There are a number of doctrinal areas in which filing
solely for declaratory relief would streamline the motion to
dismiss process across a spectrum of public interest cases.
For example, arguments related to the separation of powers,
sovereign immunity, and justiciability would be largely
foreclosed (barring other independent issues). Institutional
reform cases typically request relief in the form of things like
special food for prisoners, training for school personnel, or
adequately resourced attorneys for indigent criminal
defendants. These things cost money, which must eventually
and ultimately come from the legislature. Defendants often
contend that these requests for relief would violate
separation of powers principles because a court order would
require the legislature to spend money;179 that various state
177. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D.
Wash. 2013); Settlement Agreement, Best v. Grant Cnty., No. 04-2-00189-0
(Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2005).
178. See, e.g., Idaho Public Defense Act, ch. 247, 2014 Idaho Sess. Laws 616 (to
be codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-848 to -850, 19-853, 19-859 to -8620;
Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub. Acts 53
(codified at Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.981-780.1003 (2013)); Montana Public
Defender Act, ch. 449, 2005 Mont. Laws 1564 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 413-425, 47-1-104 to -105, 47-1-202 (2012)).
179. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 284 Mich. App. 246, 276-84 (2009) (describing
and analyzing defendants’ argument court could not order legislature to expend
money); Motion to Dismiss at 12-14, Flora v. Luzerne, 3:13-cv-01478-MEM (M.D.
Pa. June 21, 2013) (arguing the court cannot mandate additional funding for the
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immunity doctrines are implicated because plaintiffs
functionally seek an appropriation from the legislature, akin
to money damages;180 or that the claims are not justiciable.181
It is immaterial that courts reject these defenses because
the mere fact of their existence prolongs and needlessly
complicates the litigation. A case seeking public defense
reform filed in Michigan in 2007, following two years of active
investigation by the ACLU and the Brennan Center for
Justice, was only recently resolved in 2013.182 The state
supreme court granted two motions for reconsideration
(reversing itself, only to re-reverse itself)183 and ultimately
denied two additional requests for reconsideration. 184
Hundreds of pages worth of duplicative motions were filed in
the intervening years before the plaintiffs eventually
public defender office unless it would affect the court’s own ability to administer
justice); Defendants-Appellants’ Consolidated Brief, Duncan v. State, No. 278652,
278858, 278860 (Mich. Ct. App. May 30, 2008) [hereinafter DefendantsAppellants’ Consolidated Brief]; Brief for Respondents, Hurrell-Harring v. State,
No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Dec. 4, 2009).
180. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 284 Mich. App. 246, 266-71 (2009) (discussing
defendants’ immunity claims); Defendants’ Brief in Support of their Motion to
Dismiss at 23-24, Stempfle ex rel. D.B. v. Granholm, No. 2:06-cv-13548-NGE-DAS
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2007).
181. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
at 3, Harris v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., No. 1:08-CV-01435-CC (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23,
2008) [hereinafter AISS Motion to Dismiss] (systemic litigation over alternative
school); see also, e.g., Letter from Janice L. Birnbaum & Abigail Goldenberg to
Hon. Allyne Ross at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), J.G. v. Mills, No. 1:04-cv-05415-ARR-SMG
(E.D.N.Y.) (arguing that school reform case should be dismissed because 20
U.S.C. § 1232(a) prohibits federal “direction, supervision or control” over state
educational institutions); State’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Joint Petition at 8-15, Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Wyoming, No. 129-59 (D. Wyo.
Sept. 8, 2004) (arguing court should defer to legislative process in school funding
case); State’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First General Cause of Action (The
Education Clause Claims) at 2-3, Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756CI (Sup. Ct.
Alaska Dec. 21, 2004) (same).
182. Duncan Complaint, supra note 171. In the interests of full disclosure, the
author was the lead attorney on the Michigan investigation, the primary author
of the complaint, and argued the motion to dismiss before the county court.
183. Duncan v. State, 780 N.W.2d 843, rev’d, 784 N.W.2d 51, rev’d, 790 N.W.2d
695 (Mich. 2010).
184. Duncan v. State, 795 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 2011); Duncan v. State, 791
N.W.2d 721 (Mich. 2010); Duncan v. State, 795 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 2011).
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prevailed, six years after the complaint was first filed and
without taking any discovery in the case.185 And the
resolution did not come via a court-ordered injunction, but
rather bi-partisan legislation to create a state-funded public
defense system after a number of favorable court rulings.186
Because litigation seeking solely declaratory relief would
not in and of itself require any additional expenditures by the
legislature—which would be free to work out a political
solution to the problem—or a court takeover of a state
institution, it appears likely that this line of motion practice
could be side-stepped.
Defendants in these cases often also contend that
plaintiffs have not suffered or are not at imminent risk of
suffering irreparable harm and that they have an adequate
remedy at law.187 This line of reasoning typically amounts to
an administrative exhaustion argument, that plaintiffs
should undergo individual adjudication through the
institutions’ established processes before resorting to the
court system.188 In the public defense context, for example,
defendants argue that plaintiffs’ adequate remedy at law is
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim or motions to
185. See Defendants-Appellants’ Consolidated Brief, supra note 179.
186. Michigan Indigent Defense Commission Act, Act No. 93, 2013 Mich. Pub.
Acts 53 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 780.981-780.1003 (2013)); Duncan v.
State, 832 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed with
class discovery).
187. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 5, Hornsby ex rel. J.A. v. Barbour, No.
3:07cv394DPJ-JCS (S.D. Miss. Feb. 1, 2008) (making these arguments in suit over
state run juvenile training institution); SAO Defendants’ Combined
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26-27, First Def. Legal Aid v. City
of Chicago, No. 01 C 9671 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2002) (making these arguments in
suit over practices at state attorney’s office); Defendant, Secretary Michael
Moore’s Motion to Dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs on Statute of Limitations
Grounds at 8-10, NAACP v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 500-CV-157-OC-10
(M.D. Fla. May 3, 2000) (action against prison).
188. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 31-35,
ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad., No. 09-CV-138 DWF/JJG (D. Minn. Apr.
21, 2009); Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 27, Bill M. v. Neb. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 4:03CV3189 (D. Neb. Nov. 24,
2003).
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substitute counsel,189 and in the schools context, it is
individual school administrative hearings.190 Because
plaintiffs need not allege they do not have an adequate
remedy at law for declaratory relief, there is ample reason to
believe that defendants would no longer raise these
arguments on motion to dismiss (absent a statutory
requirement to exhaust).
C. Remedy
The traditional model of structural reform litigation
explicitly envisions extensive and prolonged court
involvement during the remedial phase of the litigation, as
the court plays an integral role in designing the remedy and
in its enforcement.191 This involvement comes at undeniable
cost to the court system itself, as judges must oversee
proceedings and negotiations; magistrate judges, special
masters, and monitors must be appointed and report back to
the court; consent decrees must be reviewed and approved;
and injunctions crafted and enforced. It is not unusual for
plaintiffs to attempt to prolong the court’s involvement,
assuming that continued court involvement will procure
better results and ensure greater compliance from
defendants.
In a school-to-prison pipeline reform case filed by the
ACLU in 2006, for example, plaintiffs succeeded in procuring
a comprehensive consent decree after mediation before a
magistrate judge.192 The case challenged racially
discriminatory discipline practices affecting Native
American students in a South Dakota school district.193 In
addition to prohibiting defendants from requiring students to
189. See, e.g., Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Wilbur v. City
of Mt. Vernon, 2:11-cv-01100-RSL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2011).
190. See, e.g., AISS Motion to Dismiss, supra note 181, at 10 (“Having failed to
avail themselves of their statutory remedy, Plaintiffs are now barred from seeking
equitable relief . . . .”).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
192. Consent Decree, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-03007-CBK
(D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Antoine Consent Decree].
193. Complaint, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-03007-CBK (D.S.D.
Mar. 27, 2006).

600

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

make statements that could be used against them in a
juvenile or criminal court proceeding, the decree required
defendants to: (1) abide by Fifth Amendment norms after
deciding to refer a student to law enforcement; (2) provide
annual trainings on the constitutional rights of students,
Native American education and educational equity, and
student-on-student conflict resolution; (3) retain an expert to
develop discipline procedures that would eliminate
mandatory police referrals, define discrete categories of
misconduct, set forth appropriate consequences for
misconduct, and incorporate the use of traditional Native
American practices; (4) maintain consistent and accurate
records of disciplinary incidents; (5) evaluate all students
disciplined three or more times in an academic year; (6) hire
a Native American ombudsperson and establish a Principal’s
Advisory Committee; (7) provide a series of specific Native
American classes, programs, and activities; (8) increase the
number of Native American employees; (9) improve parental
participation; (10) invite the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Education
Department to participate in school board meetings; (11)
retain a monitor to oversee defendants’ activities; and (12)
develop and meet benchmarks regarding graduation rates,
school discipline, academic achievement and other factors.194
The court was to retain jurisdiction for four consecutive
school years.195 In 2014, eight years after the original
complaint was filed, the ACLU sought an amendment to the
consent decree: “Rather than risking the possibility of having
the Original Consent Decree end in its entirety, the Amended
Consent Decree is intended to be in effect for either the next
two or four years” depending upon the school district’s ability
to meet certain outcome measures.196
This Article argues that court involvement with remedial
processes like these may in some instances be streamlined
when only a declaratory judgment is sought. Short, targeted
periods of court involvement could and would be
contemplated where defendants defy the declaration, act in
194. Antoine Consent Decree, supra note 192, at 2-15.
195. Id. at 16.
196. Notice of Proposed Amendment to Consent Decree in School
Discrimination Lawsuit at 2, Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, No. 3:06-cv03007-CBK (D.S.D. Jan. 8, 2014).
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bad faith, or fail to implement appropriate institutional
reform. But, long, broad, and continuous court involvement
would no longer be the norm.
D. Enforcement and Deterrence
In the vast majority of cases, the declaratory judgment
model will likely resolve disputes in the same way the
traditional model does, with a settlement agreement. There
are meaningful differences, however, when they do not.
Consent decrees are notoriously difficult to locate even when
one has knowledge of a particular decree’s existence.197 Both
they and structural injunctions can be strikingly specific to
the particular institution subject to a particular lawsuit. 198
This Article contends that more widespread and thoughtful
use of declaratory judgments may result in increased
transparency, transferability, and deterrence via the
articulation of constitutional norms. If the other efficiencies
identified above hold, they may also result in increased
litigation activity which can itself increase deterrence. We
can reasonably assume that at least some institutional
defendants choose not to undertake institutional reform
because they believe no one has the resources to sue them
and/or they believe they might as well wait until someone
does. The efficiencies identified in this section are most
salient where a number of similarly situated institutions are
suspected of committing the same or similar rights
violations, i.e., where “meta-structural reform” may be
needed.
Where the outcome is negotiated reform, there is no
functional difference, but declaratory judgments actually
issued that find particular actions to be rights violating
should be easier to locate, summarize, and circulate than the
contents of consent decrees and structural injunctions. They
should also be more easily applicable to other potential
defendants—although they will have no preclusive effect,
they serve as powerful evidence that subsequent litigation
over the same or similar behavior would be similarly
197. See supra text accompanying note 149-50.
198. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 194 (describing consent decree
issued in Antoine v. Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2).
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successful. This dynamic should be particularly forceful
where the litigation filed is purely rights-determining, as in
the religious freedom of exercise cases in various institutions,
such as prisons. These cases seek a simple adjudication of
rights: whether prisoners have a right to the particular item
or activity requested. The ability to replicate results quickly,
cheaply, and effectively should be particularly compelling in
this context; the applicable law is a federal statute, many
would-be plaintiffs lack funds and access to litigation
resources, and similar issues are presumably widespread.
And yet plaintiffs’ counsel in these cases consistently
seek declaratory relief only in conjunction with injunctive
relief, with little to no value added as a result of the
injunctive relief. In Moussazadeh v. Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, for example, attorneys from the Becket
Fund (which specializes in litigating religious liberty cases)
and Latham & Watkins LLP sought both declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of a Jewish prisoner who had been
denied kosher food in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).199 Six months
after the suit was filed, the district court stayed discovery at
the request of the parties to permit settlement
negotiations.200 A year later, Texas began to offer kosher food
in many of its prison dining halls.201 The litigation
recommenced when the original plaintiff, who was still
incarcerated, committed disciplinary infractions and was
transferred to a unit that offered kosher food only for
purchase.202 The Fifth Circuit eventually ruled that the
prison’s practices had substantially burdened the plaintiff’s
ability to exercise his religious beliefs and remanded the case
to the district court.203
199. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Attorneys Fees; And
Demand for Jury Trial, Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t Criminal Justice, No. 3:07-cv00574 (E.D. Tex., Oct. 12, 2005).
200. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 785 (5th Cir.
2012).
201. Id. at 785-86.
202. Id. at 786.
203. Id. at 794.
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Several aspects of this case are noteworthy. First and
foremost, within months, the lawsuit successfully provided
the leverage necessary to get defendants to the bargaining
table and in large part procured the relief requested. Second,
the Fifth Circuit ruling functioned largely as a declaration of
rights, holding that forcing Jewish inmates to pay for kosher
food is a substantial burden for the purposes of RLUIPA and
that prisons seeking to do so must demonstrate that it is the
least restrictive alternative.204 The parties could either
appeal this functional declaration, work through it on their
own in conjunction with the political and administrative
agency processes, seek additional guidance from a court on
remand, or all of the above.205 The request for injunctive relief
neither drove the outcome of the case nor improved it, and a
lawsuit that sought solely declaratory relief might well have
resulted in a clearer statement from the courts more readily
transferable to other prison systems and claims.
These observations hold true even where plaintiffs
succeed in procuring a consent decree for all intents and
purposes identical to a structural injunction. For example, in
a case over an inmate’s right under RLUIPA to obtain and
use eagle feathers in connection with Native American
religious exercises, the ACLU obtained a consent decree
tethered to changes the Wyoming Department of Corrections
made to its Handbook of Religious Beliefs.206 After litigation,
the handbook was edited to permit Native American
prisoners up to four eagle feathers, with the proviso that they
“may be kept as loose feathers or may be bound together with
string, sinew, or beaded string,” in addition to “a feather fan
comprised of more than four feathers . . . for group
activities . . . .”207 A declaration of rights pursuant to RLUIPA
would arguably be of greater use to future plaintiffs.

204. Id. at 795-96.
205. In Moussazadeh, defendants did actually seek an en banc hearing but were
denied. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 709 F.3d 487, 488 (5th
Cir. 2013).
206. Consent Decree and Order of Dismissal, Yellowbear v. Lampert, No. 08CV-013J (D. Wyo. July 29, 2008).
207. Id. at 2.
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E. Protecting Future Structural Reform Efforts
Although not properly a phase of litigation, one
additional way in which declaratory judging may better meet
the constraints of the new reform era is by preserving and
protecting structural reform as an option for future
generations of litigators. In 2013, federal district court Judge
Shira Scheindlin issued a truly Fissian structural injunction
against the New York City police department pursuant to a
decision finding its stop and frisk policies and practices
unconstitutional.208 What at first appeared a powerful
repudiation of the premise of this Article evolved into a
political firestorm that underscores how urgent and
important it is for litigators to recognize the emerging new
era of public interest reform.
The Floyd and Ligon cases were brought, litigated, and
adjudicated pursuant to the old rules. As the Second Circuit
later described it, “[t]en days before Judge Scheindlin’s
supervisory authority under the settlement agreement [in a
different case] was set to expire, she heard argument on a
motion brought by the . . . plaintiffs to extend the settlement
period” and counseled them to file a lawsuit.209 In the manner
of the prototypical “hero judge,”210 she stated, “[i]f you got
proof of inappropriate racial profiling in a good constitutional
case, why don’t you bring a lawsuit? You can certainly mark
it as related.”211 Plaintiffs’ counsel—which included the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional
Rights, Shearman & Sterling LLP, and Covington & Burling
LLP—obliged, filing suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
208. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
209. Ligon v. City of New York (In re Reassignment of Cases), 736 F.3d 118, 124
(2d Cir. 2013).
210. Scheindlin’s judging style is presumably informed and influenced by her
personal experiences serving as a special master. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and
Wrongs: A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk, THE NEW YORKER (May 27, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/27/130527fa_fact_toobin?current
Page=all; cf. Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge, supra note 3.
211. Joseph Goldstein, Court Blocks Stop-and-Frisk Changes for New York
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/nyregion/
court-blocks-stop-and-frisk-changes-for-new-york-police.html?_r=0.
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relief, and marking the cases as related to the earlier case,
which was over the city’s racial profiling practices.212
The injunction Judge Scheindlin eventually issued was
majestic in scope, seemingly a dream come true for plaintiffs’
counsel. It begins with the premise that “the court has the
power to order broad equitable relief,” including “broad
authority to enter injunctive relief.”213 Among other things, it
requires the city to appoint a particular monitor to oversee
the required reforms and specifies the monitor’s roles and
functions; orders a joint remedial process, and specifies how
that process is to be carried out; requires that certain police
department forms be revised; requires the police to provide
narrative descriptions of stops in activity logs; requires the
police department to transmit a message about the court’s
ruling over its internal messaging system; and orders the
department to implement a one year pilot project testing the
use of body cameras.214
Roughly two months later, the fallout began. The Second
Circuit granted Defendants’ request for a stay and, in an
unusual order, also found that “the appearance of
impartiality had been compromised by certain statements
made by Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district
court and in media interviews.”215 It reassigned the case to a
different district judge, to be chosen randomly.216 It also
issued a subsequent opinion explaining the basis for and
superseding that order.217 Judge Scheindlin retained counsel
for herself, including four law professors, who filed a brief on
her behalf before the Second Circuit.218 The entire kerfuffle
212. Complaint, Ligon v. City of New York, No. 1:12-cv-02274 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2012); Complaint, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 1:08-cv-01034 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
31, 2008).
213. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671, 674.
214. Id. at 676-89.
215. Ligon v. City of New York (In re Reassignment of Cases), 736 F.3d 118, 121
(2d Cir. 2013).
216. Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2013).
217. Ligon, 736 F.3d at 129.
218. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Last Word on Stop-and-Frisk?, THE NEW YORKER
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/11/thelast-word-on-stop-and-frisk.html.
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was eventually mooted on January 1, 2014, with the
inauguration of a new New York City mayor, who had
campaigned in part on promises to reform the stop and frisk
policies of the police department and who vowed to drop the
city’s appeal.219
The saga of the Floyd and Ligon cases offers a number of
lessons for reformers, who ultimately got what they
wanted—an end to racially charged stop and frisk practices
in New York City—but through the political process rather
than litigation. Although they requested and initially
received a structural injunction from a judge who by all
intents was committed to “doing justice” in the Fissian sense,
that injunction was never implemented and the backlash
against it from within the courts was fierce. It is futile to
speculate as to whether a declaration of illegality would have
been greeted in the same manner, but the injunction was
issued in the context of a judge-prompted, centered, and
managed litigation, and that judicial centricity was at the
heart of the Second Circuit’s objections. The Floyd and Ligon
litigation and ensuing remedies opinion were, in other words,
everything the new era is not.220
CONCLUSION
Brown has served as a touchstone for generations of
public interest lawyers and its gravitational pull is hard to
escape. The story it tells is a compelling one for those who
seek to do justice, engendering hope in those who see the need
for wide-scale institutional change. But the model of reform
219. Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2014) (granting city’s
motion to remand to district court for settlement discussions and refusing to
decide motions by police unions to intervene in case).
220. In Judge Scheindlin’s defense, she gave defendants a first bite at the apple
by welcoming them to the bargaining table and issued the injunction only after
the city refused to participate. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668,
674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“I have always recognized the need for caution in ordering
remedies that affect the internal operations of the NYPD, the nation’s largest
municipal police force and an organization with over 35,000 members. I would
have preferred that the City cooperate in a joint undertaking to develop some of
the remedies ordered in this Opinion. Instead, the City declined to
participate . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
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it has inspired has grown cumbersome and increasingly illsuited to the legal, political, and social pressures of our time.
This Article urges not so much a repudiation of Brown in
the face of these pressures as a reconceptualization:
reformers must re-read Brown I and Brown II together in
their proper historical context.221 Brown I ended in a
declaration of constitutional rights and an invitation to the
South to participate in the process of crafting a remedy.222
Fifty-four weeks passed between Brown I and Brown II,
during which time a number of communities voluntarily
desegregated their schools and others announced they would
resist.223 Prior to the hearing in Brown II, the Court received
input from a number of stakeholders, including the NAACP,
the federal government, and a number of southern states. 224
And in the wake of Brown II, after another decade of massive
resistance, a political solution was finally arrived at in the
form of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.225 The new era in structural
reform may not be so new after all, for the historical path
marked by Brown hews closely to the one described in this
Article: an initial declaration followed by a court-imposed
remedy, followed by politically crafted relief.226 But read in
221. Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7-12 (2014) (urging
an expansion of the civil rights canon beyond Brown to include the landmark
statutes of the era as well).
222. 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954).
223. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 714 (1st 1976).

OF

224. Id. at 723-36.
225. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (enacted July 2,
1964).
226. Others have commented on this dynamic. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 16,
at 674-76 (tracing the historical development of the Court’s transition from legally
mandating desegregation to legally mandating integration); Gewirtz, supra note
21, at 614-16 (discussing the implications of resistance to remedial effectiveness
in the context of Brown); Sunstein, 1995 Term, supra note 15, at 51 (noting that
“it is at least relevant to the evaluation of Brown that the Court did not impose
its principle all at once, and that it allowed room for other branches to discuss the
mandate and to adapt themselves to it”); cf. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 3
(describing Brown II as “a recognition of the magnitude of the task and an attempt
to buy time”); Gewirtz, supra note 21, at 610 (commenting on the meaning and
function of the phrase, “all deliberate speed,” in Brown II).

608

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

this way, perhaps reformers can truly build a new way of
doing justice.
There will be inevitable resistance to this proposal, both
from hard-driving litigators who have invested so much time,
energy, and resources in the old way of litigating these cases,
and from idealists who feel great affection for a remedy that
has long served their reform goals well. The structural
injunction will likely be with us for some time and hopefully
will never entirely depart the scene. But as none other than
Fiss reminds us, it “must be seen in instrumental terms.”227
The structural injunction is not a goal in and of itself, but
rather a means to an end. We must decouple the right from
the remedy, lest the resistance to structural injunctions
evolve into resistance to structural reform itself.

227. Fiss, 1978 Term, supra note 2, at 50.

